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arbitrationand the courts, we then discuss contemporary issues and
problems. Finally, we close with recommendations about the future.
Because we focus on the relationshipbetween laborarbitrationandthe
federal courts, the analysisand recommendations centeronffundamen1
tal problems andfuture directions ratherthan individual cases.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Labor arbitration is one of the most enduring and successful social
institutions of our time? There are approximately 165,000 collective
bargaining agreements in force today, more than ninety-five percent of
which provide for the arbitration of grievances In the federal government, the majority of collective bargaining agreements are required to4
contain provisions allowing for the arbitration of employee grievances,
yet the widespread acceptance of grievance arbitration is relatively
recent.' Employers traditionally resisted grievance arbitration because
they did not want a third party fixing the terms and conditions of
employment.6 Congress was ambivalent - supporting arbitration, for
example, in the Railway Labor Act,7 but hardly mentioning it in the
Nationial Labor Relations Act and its amendments.' Meanwhile, courts
demonstrated hostility towards all non-judicial forums for the resolution
of labor disputes.9 In the years that followed World War II, for
example, state and federal courts often refused to enforce agreements to
arbitrate unless the party seeking arbitration could produce evidence to
establish the claim,"° As stated in the New York Appellate Division's
decision in Cutler-Hammer," "[i]f the meaning of the provision of the
contract sought to be arbitrated is beyond dispute there cannot be

2. Tim Bornstein, Introduction To The System of Labor and Employment Arbitration, in
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION 1 (Tim Bornstein & Ann Gosline eds., 1995).

3. Id. at 1-2. See also J.Joseph Loewenberg, Structure of Grievance Procedures,35 LAB.
L.J. 44 (1985) (stating that approximately 89% of collective bargaining agreements contain
provisions for arbitration of grievances); BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 37 (BNA) (13th
ed. 1992).
4. Charles J.Coleman, Grievance Arbitration in the Public Sector: Status, Issues, and
Problems, 17 J. COLLECT. NEGOTIATIONS PUB. SECTOR 89, 90 (1988).
5. Dennis R. Nolan & Roger L Abrams, American LaborArbitration: The Early Years, 35
FLA. L. Rnv. 373, 377 (1983) [hereinafter Early Years]; Dennis R.Nolan & Roger 1. Abrams,
American LaborArbitration: The MaturingYears, 35 FLA. L. REV. 557, 558 (1983) [hereinafter
Maturing Years].
6. Early Years, supra note 5, at 380.
7. Early Years, supra note 5, at 386.
8. MaturingYears, supra note 5, at 582.
9. David E. Feller, Presidential Address: Bye Bye Trilogy, Hello Arbitration, Address Before
the Proceedings of the 46th Annual Meeting of the NATIONAL ACADEMlY OF ARBITRATORS 1, 2
(1993) [hereinafter Feller].
10. Id.
11. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, 67 N.Y.S.2d. 317 (App. Div. 1947),
aff'd, 297 N.Y. 519 (1947).
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anything to1 2arbitrate and the contract cannot be said to provide for
arbitration."
The United States Supreme Court began to chart a new course in the
late 1950s. The Court was undoubtedly influenced by the fact that the
arbitration of employee grievances had become a well established,
generally accepted labor relations practice. 13 It was probably influenced
by the increasing involvement of the state courts in the interpretation of
labor agreements evidenced by decisions such as Cutler Hammer.4 In
four cases decided between 1957 and 1960 - Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills,15 United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co., 6
United Steelworkers v. Warriorand GulfNavigation Co., 7 and United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.'8 - the Supreme Court
cast aside its reservations about arbitration and gave it unqualified
support. 9 This article examines those cases and their progeny. The
accompanying "Genealogy of U.S. Federal Court Cases on Labor
Arbitration' provides the outline for much of this study. This figure
identifies those four cases that established the foundation for contemporary labor arbitration and four sets of cases that have defined, developed,
and changed that foundation. We treat the cases within each set in
chronological order.
This article focuses on federal court decisions because that is where
the legal underpinnings of American labor arbitration have been
established. The only exception lies in our treatment of the National
Labor Relations Board's ("NLRB" or "Board") deferral policies, where
Board decisions have formed the basic policies.2" Although state
decisions and local regulations have had a profound influence on labor
relations in state and local government, 2' we have not discussed them
because they do not constitute a uniform body of law and should be

12. Cutler-Hammer,67 N.Y.S.2d at 318.
13. Maturing Years, supra note 5, at 577-78.
14. WiLuAm B. GOULD, A PftmE OF AMER CAN LaBOR LAW 142 (1993).
15. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
16. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
17. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
18. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
19. Maturing Years, supra note 5, at 590-91.
20. See, e.g., Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971); Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112
N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955); Dubo Mfg. Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. 431 (1963).
21. Such is the case with various state "right to work laws" which effectively trump so-called
"union shop" agreements. For a summary discussion of state "right to work laws" see ARCHIBALD
Cox ET AL., LAuO LAWv CASES ND MATEmALS 1117-21 (1lth ed. 1993).
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considered only within their separate areas of authority.
11.

THE FOUNDATION CASES AND THE MINIMALIST PARADIGM

Between 1957 and 1960, four Supreme Court cases established the

legal foundation for labor arbitration in the United States.2

All four

cases concerned Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act

('"LMRA"),l which provides that suits for contract violations between
employers and labor organizations may be brought in federal district

courts.24

In all four cases, the Court either ordered arbitration or

enforced an award over the opposition of the employer or the lower
courts. These decisions determined the enforceability of arbitration
provisions in collective bargaining agreements and the roles of the courts
and the arbitrator.' The last three of these cases have become known
as the Steelworkers Trilogy 6

A. Lincoln Mills: Arbitration as Quid Pro Quo for Promise
Not to Strike
The issue in Lincoln Mills2 7 concerned the company's refusal to
arbitrate several grievances concerning work load and work assignments 8 The union responded by filing suit in federal district court to
compel arbitration.2 9 The district court ordered the employer to comply
with the arbitration provision in the collective bargaining agreement, but

22. See supra text accompanying notes 15-18.
23. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (current
version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1988 & Supp. V 1994)).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1988); See Feller, supra note 9, at 4. The Union made a strategic
decision to proceed under Section 301 of the NLRA rather than under the Federal Arbitration Act
[hereinafter FAA]; Feller, supra note 9, at 3.
25. Feller, supra note 9, at 4-5.
26. The Steelworkers Trilogy consists of three Supreme Court decisions which are jointly cited
for the proposition that a labor arbitration award may not be judicially vacated or reviewed if the
award has its basis within the terms of the collective bargaining agreement under which the dispute
was submitted. See United Steelworkers v. warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
27. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
28. Id. at 449.
29. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 230 F.2d 81, 83 (5th Cir. 1956), rev'd,353 U.S.
448 (1957).
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the court of appeals reversed in a divided vote.30 After reviewing
legislative history," and noting the desire of Congress to promote

"collective bargaining that ended with agreements not to strike,"3' the
U.S. Supreme Court concluded that "the agreement to arbitrate grievanc' 33
es disputes is the quid pro quo for an agreement not to strike.
Section 301 of the LMRA does more than confer jurisdiction. 4 It
expresses a policy that federal courts should enforce agreements to

arbitrate because "it will thereby promote industrial peace. '"3" In
contrast to other forms of arbitration, labor arbitration is not simply an
alternative to litigation. It is an alternative to direct action by employees.
This decision placed the enforcement power of the federal court system
fully behind the arbitration process.
B. The Steelworkers Trilogy, Part I: Limiting the Role of the Courts

In the first two cases in the Steelworkers Trilogy, American
Manufacturingand Warrior & Guif,the Supreme Court defined the role
of the arbitrator broadly while restricting the role of the courts. In
American Manufacturing,6 the contract with the union contained an
agreement calling for the arbitration of all grievances.3 7 When the
company refused to restore the job of a partially disabled employee3 8
and refused to arbitrate the issue as well, the union filed suit. 39 The
lower courts dismissed the union petition, holding that the grievance was

30. Id. at 89 (Brown, J. dissenting). Judge Brown accepted the majority's approach on the
jurisdictional issue that "under neither Alabama nor Federal law is there a right to enforce
arbitration." Id. at 90.
31. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 452. The House considered making the failure to abide by a
labor-management agreement an unfair labor practice, but the Conference Report stated that once
the parties had made a collective bargaining contract, its enforcement "should be left to the usual
processes of the law." Id. (citing H.R. CoNF.REP. No.510, 80th Cong., Ist
Sess. 42 (1947)). The
court quoted the Senate report which stated that "the aggrieved party should have the right of action
in the Federal Courts:' Id. at 453.
32. Id. at 453.
33. Id. at 455.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
37. Id at 565 n.l.
38. Id. at 566. The employee had settled a workmen's compensation claim against the
company on the basis of a permanent partial disability. Id. He maintained, however, that he was
fit for work, and the company disputed his claim. Id. at 564.
39. Id. at 566.
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frivolous.4 However, the Supreme Court decided that both lower courts
had erred when they attempted to weigh the merits of the employee's
claim.41 The arbitration clause in the contract called for submission of all
42
grievances to arbitration, not just those a court considered worthy.
The Court concluded:
The function of the court is very limited when the parties have agreed
to submit all questions of contract interpretation to the arbitrator. It is
confined to ascertaining whether the party seeking arbitration is making
a claim which on its face is governed by the contract. Whether the
moving party is right or wrong is a question of contract interpretation
for the arbitrator .... When the judiciary undertakes to determine the
merits of a grievance under the guise of interpreting... bargaining
agreements, it usurps a function which ... is entrusted to the
arbitration tribunal. 43
The second Trilogy case, Warrior& Gulf,centered on management
rights. The collective bargaining agreement signed by the Company
provided that, unless expressly excluded, all issues on which the parties
disagreed must fall within the scope of the grievance and arbitration
procedure.4 s The employees sought to arbitrate a grievance over
contracting out.46 When the employer resisted, the union filed suit.47
Although the lower courts concluded that the contract did not permit
arbitration of the employer's business judgment,4 s the Supreme Court
ordered the company to arbitrate.4 9 The Court stated that an order to
arbitrate a grievance can be denied only if"it may be said with positive
assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation
that covers the [ ] dispute." '0 Because the topic of contracting out was
not specifically excluded, the company was obliged to arbitrate the

40. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 264 F.2d 624, 628 (6th Cir. 1959), rev'd, 363
U.S. 564 (1960). The court found the claim "frivolous, [a] patently baseless one, not subject to
arbitration... 2' Id.
41. American Mfg., 363 U.S. at 568.
42. Id. at 568.
43. Id. at 567-69.
44. United Steelworkers v. warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
45. Id. at 576.
46. Id. at 575-76.
47. Id. at 575. The bargaining unit had been reduced from 42 to 23 employees due, in part,
to contracting out maintenance work. Id.
48. Id. at 577.
49. Id. at 585.
50. Id. at 582-83.
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issue.5
C.

The Trilogy, Part II: Expanding and Limiting the Role of the
Arbitrator

The Warrior & Gulf Court depicted the arbitrator as part of a
system of industrial self-government 2 The collective bargaining
agreement "is more than a contract; it is a generalized code to govern a
myriad of cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate."'53 A
bargaining agreement is an effort to erect a system of industrial selfgovernment with the grievance machinery at its heart. 4 It "calls into
being a new common law -the common law of a particular industry or
a particular plant."'55 This "source of law" is not confined to the
express provisions of the contract. The practices of the industry and the
shop also are part of the agreement, notwithstanding the fact that those
practices were not explicitly expressed in the contract.5 6 The parties
choose the arbitrator because they have confidence that his judgment
"will reflect not only what the contract says but, insofar as the collective
bargaining agreement permits, such factors as the effect upon productivity"' and morale, and "whether tensions will be heightened or diminished."58
After describing the arbitrator's role so broadly in Warrior& Gulf,
the Court limited it in the third Trilogy case, Enterprise Wheel. 59 The
issue in Enterprise Wheel was whether an arbitrator's decision could call
for reinstatement of a discharged employee with back pay for a period
beyond the expiration date of the contract." The United States District
Court for the District of West Virginia directed the company to
comply,61 however the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that the arbitrator had no authority to award post-contract

51. Id. at 584-85.
52. Id. at 580.
53. Id. at 578.
54. Id. at 581.
55. Id. at 579.
56. Id. at 581-82.
57. Id. at 582.
58. Id.
59. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
60. Id. at 595-96. A group of employees walked off the job in response to the discharge of
one of the workers. The next day they were discharged. Id. at 595.
61. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 168 F. Supp. 308, 309 (S.D.W.V.
1958), rev d, 269 F.2d 327, 331, (4th Cir. 1959), rev'd, 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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expiration pay.62 The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court
holding that it had exceeded its fumction.63 The Court found the
arbitrator's opinion ambiguous,' however, because it also found that
the decision appeared to be based on the contract, it ruled that the
arbitrator's award should be enforced.6 The Court then moved to a
consideration of the arbitrator's function, formulating what has become
known as the "Essence Test."'66
When an arbitrator is commissioned to interpret and apply the
collective bargaining agreement, he is to bring his informed judgment
to bear in order to reach a fair solution of a problem ....Nevertheless, an arbitrator... does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice. He may, of course, look to guidance from many sources,
yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the
collective bargaining agreement. When the arbitrator's words manifest
an infidelity
to this obligation, courts [must] refuse enforcement of the
67
award.
D. Establishing the Minimalist Paradigm
Lincoln Mills, American Manufacturing, Warrior & Gulf, and
Enterprise Wheel established a new foundation for labor arbitration in the
United States. These cases have led to a system whereby collective
bargaining agreements have become more than an alternative to litigation; they have become an alternative to a strike. While courts may
determine whether there is a duty to arbitrate, they will provide for a
broad presumption of arbitrability unless the contract clearly excludes the
dispute from arbitration. Although arbitrators are not to administer their
own brand of industrial justice, they are not limited to the words of the
contract. As long as the award draws its essence from the bargaining
agreement, arbitrators may consider past practice and other items that
make up "the common law of the shop." 68 Provided that the award is
based on the contract, a court should enforce it without examining its
merits.
62. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 269 F.2d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1959),
rev'd, 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
63. EnterpriseWheel, 363 U.S. at 598-99.

64. Id. at 597.
65. Id. at 598.
66. Id. at 597.

67. Id.
68. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582.
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These cases lay out a model of arbitration that we call the minimalist paradigm.6 9 It places the courts in a "hands-off' position. The
parties have exchanged a promise: the union has promised not to strike
during the term of the contract," and management has promised in
return, that it will arbitrate all grievances and abide by the arbitrator's
award. Under this model, the courts will enforce the agreement to
arbitrate and uphold the award provided that: (1) the arbitrator does not
exceed the powers that have been granted by the collective agreement;
(2) the award draws its essence from the agreement; and (3) the award
does not sanction or command an illegal act.7
]IR.

THE iNIMALIST PARADIGM AND THE AGREEMENT To
ARBITRATE

In 1962, the United States Supreme Court heard three cases on the
enforcement of the duty to arbitrate - Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas
72 Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. American
Flour,
Bakery & Confectionery
Workers International Local 50," and Sinclair Refining Co. v.
Atkinson.74 Each case involved strikes during the term of the contract
over grievances that the union refused to arbitrate. In Lucas and Drake,
the Court enforced the duty to arbitrate,75 holding that a no-strike clause
would be inferred if the contract contained an agreement to arbitrate
grievances7 6 and that arbitration clauses "are meant to survive breaches
of contract... even total breach[es]." ' However, before the year had
ended, the Court reversed itself. In Sinclair,the Court refused to grant
an employer's plea for injunctive relief when confronted with a strike in
violation of the contract. 78 The Court concluded that the anti-injunction

69. This is a term of art coined for this article.
70. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970) (holding that the
courts may enjoin a strike during the contract term where the collective bargaining agreement
contains a no strike clause and the parties have agreed to arbitrate disputes).
71. See Maturing Years, supra note 5, at 595-96.
72. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
73. 370 U.S. 254 (1962).
74. 370 U.S. 195 (1962), overruledby Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S.
235 (1970).
75. Drake, 370 U.S. at 264; Lucas, 369 U.S. at 105.
76. Lucas, 369 U.S. at 105-06.
77. Drake, 370 U.S. at 262.
78. Sinclair,370 U.S. at 214-15. In a second case involving the same parties, the Court also
held that the officers of the union which struck in violation of a no-strike clause could not be held
liable when the union was liable. Id. at 238. Nineteen years later the Supreme Court held that
individual employees could not be sued for damages arising out of a wildcat strike. Complete Auto
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provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act79 took precedence over the
arbitration provision in the collective bargaining agreement. 0
The Sinclairdecision stood for eight years until the foundation for
contemporary law on the enforcement of the agreement to arbitrate was
laid down in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770.!' In Boys
Markets, the bargaining agreement contained a no-strike clause and a
provision for binding arbitration. 2 In spite of these provisions, the
union struck rather than arbitrate a grievance over supervisors performing
the work of bargaining unit personnel s3 Despite the Sinclair doctrine,
the district court granted the employer's request for injunctive relief and
ordered arbitration.' The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit felt bound by Sinclair and reversed the district court's
decision. 5 On further appeal, however, the Supreme Court reconsidered the issue and reversed Sinclair. Focusing on how the Sinclair
decision "seriously undermined the effectiveness of the arbitration
technique as a method peacefully to resolve industrial disputes," s6 the
Court held that the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act did not preclude a federal court from enjoining a strike in breach of
a no-strike obligation where the contract provided for binding arbitration
of the grievance that led to the strike3 7
This basic principle was reinforced six years later in Buffalo Forge
v. United Steelvorkers.8 In Buffalo Forge, the employer's office and
clerical-technical employees went on strike and picketed the plants3 9
When the production and maintenance employees honored the picket
lines, the employer filed suit,9" claiming that the work stoppage violated
the no-strike clause contained within the labor-management agreement.9 '
The United States District Court for the Western District of New York
held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibited it from issuing an

Transit v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401 (1981).

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1988).
Sinclair,370 U.S. at 199.
398 U.S. 235 (1970).
Id. at 238-39.
Id. at 239. The work the supervisors performed was stocking frozen food shelves. Id.
Id. at 238. The case was initially filed in California Superior Court. The state court issued

a temporary restraining order, and the union removed the case to federal district court. Id.at 239-40.

85. Id. at 238.
86. Id. at 252.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 253.
428 U.S. 397 (1976).
Id. at 400.
Id. at 401-02.
Id. at 401.
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injunction because the arbitration clause in the collective bargaining
agreement did not extend to sympathy strikes.92 Both the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court affirmed the decision. 3 The difference
between this case and Boys Markets was the cause of the strike. The
arbitration provision was enforced in Boys Markets because the strike
took place over an arbitrable grievance. 94 In comparison, the matter
that prompted the Buffalo Forge strike was not arbitrable and, as a result,
the Norris-LaGuardia anti-injunction provisions prevailed.
A. The Successor Employer's Duty to Arbitrate
Does the duty to arbitrate survive a change in ownership? This
principle was decided in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston.95 In
Wiley, the union had a bargaining agreement with Interscience Publishers
that did not contain an express provision that would make the contract
binding on successor companies.96 During the term of this contract,
Interscience merged with Wiley & Sons and ceased doing business. 97
When Wiley & Sons refused to recognize the union or to accede to its
claims on behalf of the Interscience employees, the union brought suit
to compel arbitration under the agreement with Interscience." This suit
was denied in the lower courts, 99 but the Supreme Court, extensively
0 0 ordered arbitration under the Interscience bargainciting the Trilogy,
10 1
ing agreement.
[T]he disappearance by merger of a corporate employer which has
entered into a collective bargaining agreement.., does not automatically terminate all rights of the employeei covered by the agreement... in appropriate circumstances, present here, the successor
employer may
be required to arbitrate with the union under the
02
agreement.

92. Id. at 402-03.
93. Id. at 403-04.
94. Id. at 402-03.
95. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
96. Id. at 544.
97. Id. at 544-45.
98. Id. at 545.46.
99. Livingston v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 313 F.2d 52, 54 (2d Cir. 1963).
100. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
101. Livingston v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 313 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1963), rev'g, 203 F. Supp.
171 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), afTd, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
102. Wiley, 376 U.S. at 548.
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A successor employer is not required to adopt the substantive terms
of the predecessor's bargaining agreement, but it inherits the contractual
duty to bargain and to arbitrate as long as there is "substantial continu-

ity" between the old and the new companies.0 3 The Court found this
continuity because the Interscience work-force remained virtually
unchanged after the merger." 4
The Court refined this doctrine ten years later in HowardJohnson

Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Board.' The Grissom family
operated a restaurant and motor lodge under franchise from Howard
Johnson.'

Howard Johnson purchased the operation under an

agreement which provided that the successors did not assume any of the
seller's obligations, including the existing contract with the union."°
When the company refused to honor the predecessor's bargaining

agreement, the union brought suit to compel arbitration. Despite the fact
that Howard Johnson had hired forty-five new employees while retaining
only nine of the former personnel,' both the district and the appellate
courts concluded that the company was required to arbitrate.0 9

However, the Supreme Court did not agree." 0 The Court distinguished
this case from Wiley on the basis of the substantial changes in the work

force."'

103. Id. at 551.
104. Id. at 551. The Interscience bargaining unit had contained 40 employees. All "except a
few" continued in Wiley's employ. Id. at 545. The Wiley case also held that matters of substantive
arbitrability are for the court to decide while matters of procedural arbitrability may be decided by
the arbitrator. However, if a substantive challenge to arbitration is raised and the court determines
that the matter is arbitrable, the arbitrator decides the merits. Id. at 556-58.
105. 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
106. Id. at 250-51.
107. Id. at 251-52.
108. Id. at 252.
109. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd. v. Howard Johnson Co., 482 F.2d 489, 490 (6th Cir.
1973), rev'd,417 U.S. 249 (1974).
110. See Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
111. Id. at 258-59 (finding that Howard Johnson terminated all of the Grissom employees and
included only nine of the former employees of the company in its new work-force); cf. NLRB v.
Burns Int'l See. Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972) (holding that where the bargaining unit remained
unchanged and a majority of the employees hired by the new employer were represented by the
predecessor's union, the employer was obligated to bargain with that union); see also Fall River
Dyeing and Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987) (holding that the "substantial and
representative complement" rule is to be used when determining the composition of the successor's
work force).
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B.

The Duty to Arbitrate after Contract Expiration

Does the duty to arbitrate survive the expiration of the contract? In
Nolde Bros. v. Bakey & Confectionery Workers Local 358,112 the
employer entered into an agreement which provided severance pay for
employees upon termination."' When negotiations failed, the company
notified the union that it was closing the plant.'14 The company paid
accrued wages but refused to grant the union's demand for severance
pay."5 The company also declined to arbitrate the claim for severance
pay on the grounds that its obligation to do so terminated with the
expiration of the bargaining agreement." 6
The union filed suit in the U.S. District Couit for the Eastern
District of Virginia to compel the company to arbitrate the severance pay
issue. 117 The court rejected the union's petition, holding that the
employees' right to severance pay and its obligation to arbitrate
grievances expired with the agreement."' The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, concluding that the duty to
arbitrate claims arising under the bargaining agreement survived the
expiration of the contract." 9 The Supreme Court affirmed this ruling
and found that a presumption favoring arbitration must be negated
expressly or by clear implication and that an arbitration clause may
120
survive the termination of the contract.
The Supreme Court limited this determination fourteen years later
- in Litton FinancialPrintingDivision v. NLRB."' Litton involved an
expired bargaining agreement, a company decision to lay off a number
of workers, a refusal to arbitrate the layoffs, and an NLRB decision that
this post-expiration abandonment of the contractual grievance procedure
violated the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA" or "Act").'" The

112. 430 U.S. 243 (1977).
113. Id. at 245.

114. Id. at 247.
115. Id.
116. Id.

117. Local 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers v. Nolde Bros., 382 F. Supp. 1354, 1356
(E.D. Va. 1974), rev'd, 530 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1975).
118. Id. at 1357.

119. Local 358, Bakers & Confectionery Workers v. Nolde Bros., 530 F.2d 548, 553 (4th Cir.
1975), aff'd, 430 U.S. 243 (1977).
120. Nolde Bros. v. Local 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers, 430 U.S. 243, 255 (1977).
121. Litton Financial Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190 (1991).
122. Id. at 194-95.
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Board ordered Litton Financial to bargain with the union over the layoffs, but it did not order the layoff disputes to be arbitrated because they
did not arise under the expired contract.'2 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit enforced the Board's order to bargain, but
it also determined that the layoff disputes originated under the agreement,
and therefore, were arbitrable.124 The Supreme Court disagreed." z
Its decision limited the Nolde holding on post-expiration disputes to cases
where the grievance was based upon facts and events that occurred
before the contract expired; the action infringed upon a right that accrued
under the agreement; or where, under the normal principles of contract
right survived expiration of the
interpretation, the disputed contractual
126
agreement.
the
of
remainder
In 1994, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
attempted to reconcile Nolde and Litton, ruling that agreements can be
"implied in fact" when an employer continues to operate the enterprise
with the unionized employees after the expiration of the agreement
despite the employer's formal "termination" of the agreement.127
Disputes that arise under this implied-in-fact agreement are arbitrable.
provides a remarkably strong statement in support of
This decision
28
arbitration.1
C.

General Arbitrability Revisited: A.T & T Technologies

In 1986, the Supreme Court revisited the general topic of
arbitrability in A.T & T Technologies v. Communications Workers of
America.'2 9 While affirming its earlier stand on the enforcement of the
agreement to arbitrate, the A.T & T Technologies Court introduced
another dimension. The A.T. & T. labor contract contained an arbitration
clause, a management functions clause, 3 ' and a clause prescribing the

Litton Financial Printing Div., 286 N.L.R.B. 817, 821-22 (1987).
NLRB v. Litton Financial Printing Div., 893 F.2d 1128, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 1990).
Litton, 501 U.S. at 206.
Litton, 501 U.S. at 206; see also Reginald H. Alleyne, Actions to Stay and Compel
Arbitration,in LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ARBiTRATION § 50.04[5] (Tim Bornstein & Ann Gosline
eds., 1995). When "grievance-prompting events take place after the expiration of the collective
bargaining agreement, the grievance is generally not arbitrable:' Id. § 50.04.
127. Luden's Inc. v. Local 6, Bakery Workers, 28 F3d 347, 355 (3d Cir. 1994).
128. Id.; see also Roger I. Abrams, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS L. & LEG. COM.
1994-1995 REP., at 1, 7.
129. 475 U.S. 643 (1986).
130. See generally NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952) (discussing and
defining management functions clauses in the context of collective bargaining).
123.
124.
125.
126.
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order in which employees were to be laid off.'3 ' However, when the
company decided to lay off a number of employees, it refused to submit
their grievance to arbitration because the management functions clause
made the layoffs non-arbitrable.131 On appeal by the union, both the

United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois 33 and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ordered the
layoff issue arbitrated. 34 However, on further appeal the Supreme
Court remanded the case to the lower courts for additional proceed3
ings. 5

Even though it reiterated the arbitrability tests it had enunciated in
Warrior& Gulf 136 the Court called attention to the evidence that might
defeat the presumption of arbitrability 3 7

In particular, Justice

Brennan's concurring opinion focused on the parties' previous bargaining
history as a possible source of evidence needed to overcome an
agreement to arbitrate. 3 8 It has been argued that this case "portends
more active litigation in an attempt to defeat the presumption of

arbitrability."' 139 This decision also reiterated an important idea that

was first put forth in Wiley" ° Both Wiley and A.T & T Technologies
14
distinguished between substantive and procedural arbitrability. '
Matters pertaining to the first topic, such as whether the arbitration clause

131. A.T. & T.Technologies, 475 U.S. at 645.
132. Id. at 646. Seventy-nine installers at the Chicago location were laid off. Id.
133. Communications Workers ofAmerica v. Western Elec. Co., No. 82 C 772 (N.D. II1.Nov.
18, 1983).
134. Communications Workers of America v. Western Elec. Co., 751 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1984).
Following 1984, Western Electric changed its name to A.T. & T. Id.
135. A.T. & 2. Technologies, 475 U.S. at 643.
136. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960). The Warrior
and Gulftests are: (1) does the contract provide for the arbitration ofgrievances and if so, (2) does
it arguably extend to the topic under consideration? Id. at 582-83.
137. A.T. & T.Technologies, 475 U.S. at 650-51.
138. Id. at 652; see also Harvey A. Nathan & Sara M. Green, Challenges to Arbilrabiliy. in
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION § 13-3 (Tim Bornstein and Ann Gosline eds., 1995).
139. Nathan & Green, supra note 138, §§ 13-3 to -4. See also Alleyne, supra note 126, at
§ 50-6. TheA.T & T.Technologiesdecision does not seem to have changed the general presumption
in favor of arbitrability. See Local 106, Serv. Employees Int'l Union v. Evergreen Cemetery, 708
F. Supp. 917 (N.D. 111.1989). The court addressed the issue of arbitrability. The disputes concerned
job assignments and filling positions. The employer contended that the arbitration provision did not
cover these disputes. Since the bargaining agreement defined a grievance as "a claim or dispute
concerning rates of pay, hours, or working conditions, or the interpretation or an application of the
terms of the agreement," the court found for the union. See also Bechtel Construction, Inc. v.
Laborers Int'l Union, 812 F.2d. 750 (1st Cir. 1987); Borden Inc. v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 677
F. Supp. 248 (D. Del. 1988).
140. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
141. Id. at 545; A.T. & T.Technologies,475 U.S. at 651.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol13/iss1/1

18

19951

Coleman and Coleman: Toward a New Paradigm of Labor Arbitration in the Federal Courts
Toward A New ParadigmOf LaborArbitration

covered the dispute, were to be determined by the courts."

However,

procedural matters, such as whether there was compliance with1 43the
grievance procedure, were to remain in the hands of the arbitrator.
IV. THE INTRODUCTION OF THE EXPANSIONIST PARADIGM:
ENFORCEMENT OF THE ARBITRATION AWARD

In United Steel Workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,'44 the
Supreme Court created an "almost unrebuttable presumption of
arbitrability."' 41 If the contract provided for arbitration and the topic
was not specifically excluded, the grievance was arbitrable: 46 "Only

the most forceful evidence"' 47 to exclude a claim from arbitration could
prevail. 148 This idea reflects what we have called the "minimalist
paradigm."' 49 By 1970, the federal courts had determined that this

142. That is, whether the parties intended to arbitrate a substantive contractual issue. For
discussion, see William B. Gould, IV, JudicialReview of LaborArbitrationAwards - Thirty Years
of the Steelworkers Trilogy: The Aftermath ofA.T. &T. andMisco, 64 NoTRE DAMiE L. REv. 464,
466 (1989).
143. Orion Pictures Corp. v. Writers Guild of Ant, Inc., 946 F.2d 722 (9th Cir. 1991). This
case adds another dimension to the determination of arbitrability. The Writers Guild of America,
which represented script writers, had negotiated a collective bargaining agreement which contained
a clause that permitted the Guild to institute an arbitration proceeding against a non-signatory. Id.
at 723. Orion pictures was a non-signatory and refused to pay the Guild members the contractually
defined royalties. Id. The Guild moved for arbitration and a hearing was held in which both
participants appeared before the arbitrator. Id. At that hearing, Orion filed a motion with the arbitrator to dismiss or to stay the case until the company could get a judicial determination. Id.at 724.
The arbitrator ruled that he had the authority to decide whether the company was bound to arbitrate
the case, but instead chose to suspend the proceedings to allow Orion to secure a judicial
determination on arbitrability. Id. The district court vacated the arbitrator's ruling, but the appellate
court found that once the question of arbitrability is submitted to arbitration, the federal court must
await the arbitrator's ruling on arbitlability and enforce it if it represents a plausible interpretation
of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 725.
144. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
145. Nathan & Green, supra note 138, § 13-3; Warrior& Gulf, 363 U.S. at 584-85.
146. Warrior & Gul, 363 U.S. 584-85.
147. Id. at 585.
148. Id. In 1992 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit determined that
management cannot refuse to arbitrate a discharge even though the employees waived their grievance
and arbitration rights under a last chance agreement. Steelworkers v. Lukens Steel Co., 969 F.2d
1468, 1478 (3d Cir. 1992). That same year, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that the duty to arbitrate extended to matters where the parties had reached an impasse.
Steelworkers v. Asarco, Inc., 970 F.2d 1448 (5th Cir. 1992). In Asarco, the parties had failed to
agree upon a drug testing policy. Id. at 1449. When the employer unilaterally instituted one, the
employees grieved and the court held that the grievances were arbitrable under contract language
which requires that the employer make "reasonable" accommodations for employee health and
safety. Id. at 1450-52.
149. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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obligation to arbitrate can supersede the anti-injunction provisions of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, and it has been extended to successor employers,"'0 to periods of times beyond that specified in the collective
5' and, on occasion,
agreement'
beyond the boundaries of the bargaining
2
unit.1
In this section we move away from the obligation to arbitrate and
address the issue of enforcing the arbitration award. The cases illustrate
the tendency of the federal courts to forsake their allegiance to the
minimalist paradigm and turn to what we call the "expansionist
paradigm."'15 This model implies a broader standard of review and a
greater willingness to set aside arbitration awards that courts found to be
displeasing. The cases will further show that while the Supreme Court
adopted a limited expansionist model, the lower courts have embraced a
much broader model.
A federal court will set aside an arbitration award for usually one
of two reasons. The first is arbitrator error - the court concludes that
the arbitrator's fact-finding was incorrect, the arbitrator exceeded the
authority specified in the collective bargaining agreement or, most
frequently, the award failed to draw its essence from the contract,"5 as
required in Enterprise Wheel."' The eight cases discussed in this
section have been chosen to illustrate this facet of the enforcement
controversy. 5 6 The two cases from the 1960s depict its historical
roots; 7 the four cases decided between 1986 and 1992 portray its
lingering nature;" 8 and the remaining two cases demonstrate its

150. John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
151. Nolde Bros. v. Local 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, 430 U.S. 243 (1977).
152. Orion Pictures Corp. v. Writers Guild of An., Inc., 946 F.2d 722 (9th Cir. 1991).

153. The term "expansionist paradigm" was created for this article.
154. Peter Feuille & Michael LeRoy, Grievance ArbitrationAppeals in the Federal Courts:
Facts and Figures,45 ARB. J. 35 (1990).

155. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
156. These cases certainly do not exhaust the topic. Over 1,000 decisions were issued by federal
district courts involving appeals from labor arbitration awards between 1961 and 1988, and over 400
were issued by the circuit courts ofappeal. Feuille & LeRoy, supra note 154, at 39. Arbitrator error
is listed as the most frequently cited basis of these appeals, particularly faulty fact-finding, exceeding
arbitral authority, and failing the "essence test." Feuille & LeRoy, supra note 154, at 43.
157. See Textile Workers Union v. American Thread Co., 291 F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1961);
Torrington Co. v. Metal Prod. Workers Local 1645, 362 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1966).

158. American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 784 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1986);
Hill v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 814 F.2d 1192 (7th Cir. 1987); Delta Queen Steamboat Co. v.

District 2 Marine Eng'r Beneficial Ass'n, 889 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1989); Polk Bros. v. Chicago Truck
Drivers, 973 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1992).
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application in the federal sector. 5 9 A second common reason for
setting aside an arbitration award comes about in cases that involve an
intermingling of contractual issues and public policy." Section V of
this article will show that until 1974, the Supreme Court by and large
remained faithful to the minimalist position that it had enunciated in the
Trilogy. However, after 1974, the Supreme Court adopted a less
deferential standard, and the circuit courts further expanded the judicial
review of labor arbitration awards.
A. Origins of the Enforcement Controversy
The enforcement controversy may be dated to Textile Workers
Union of America v. American Thread.6 1 This decision was rendered
by the same Circuit that the Supreme Court had reversed one year earlier
in Enterprise Wheel 62 In American Thread, the arbitration dealt with
an employee who had been discharged for allowing a cotton lap to run
through a carding machine.163 Despite the fact that this was his third
offense and the arbitrator found him guilty, the arbitrator reduced the
discharge to a one week suspension without pay.16 When the company refused to abide by the arbitrator's decision, the union commenced
suit in the District Court for the Western District of South Carolina to
compel compliance.' 65 The district court refused to enforce the
arbitrator's decision.1 6 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit concluded that
the arbitration decision did violence to the "clear, plain, exact and
unambiguous terms of the submission and the contract, ' 167 far exceeding the boundaries laid down by Enterprise Wheel.16
Five years later, the Torrington decision stimulated the first round

159. See Devine v. Pastore, 732 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Cornelius v. Nutt, 472 U.S. 648
(1985).
160. See infra Section V for a detailed discussion of setting aside arbitration awards in cases that
involve an intermingling of contractual issues and public policy.
161. 291 F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1961).
162. 269 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1959), rev d, 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
163. American Thread,291 F.2d at 895. •

164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.

167. Id. at 899. The dissenting judge charged that the majority had simply substituted its
judgment for that of the arbitrator and the decision violated the ruling of the Supreme Court in
Enterprise Wheel. Id. at 905 (Sobeloff, J., dissenting). See also William P. Murphy, Judicial
Review ofRewards, in LABOR AND EMPLOYmT ARBmiATON 51-1,51-8 to 51-11 (Tim Bornstein
& Ann Gosline eds., 1995) (discussing Enterprise Wheel and Torrington).
168. American Thread,291 F.2d at 905 (Sobeloff, J., dissenting).
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of academic commentary on the essence test. 69 The dispute involved
the discontinuation of a twenty year past practice in which workers had
The arbitrator found
been given one hour off duty in order to vote.'
the past practice binding on the company and held that it could be
changed only by mutual agreement. 7 ' The U.S. District Court for the
District of Connecticut set aside the arbitrator's decision.1'
The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, based
upon the belief that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority.7 3 While
many commentators disagreed with the arbitrator's decision, they also
stated that the court decision deeply undercut the law; 74 that the
exhaustiveness of the court review was far in excess of that envisioned
by Enterprise Wheel; 7 and that, despite its rhetoric, the Torrington
court simply disagreed
with the arbitrator's conclusion and substituted its
76
his.'
for
judgment
B. Later Cases: Awards Upheld
77

American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service,
which was decided two decades after Torrington, involved an employee
who had been removed from his position under the charge of wrongful
conversion of funds. 7 Although the employee had implicated himself
through statements given to the Postal Inspection Service, he was
acquitted in a criminal trial because the investigator failed to give the
required Miranda warnings 1 9 prior to the interrogation.'
The dis-

169. Torrington Co. v. Metal Products Workers Local 1645,362 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1966). For
a discussion of the "essence test" see supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
170. Torrington, 362 F.2d at 678.

171. Id. at 679.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 680.
174. See, eg., Charles B. Craver, Labor Arbitration as a Continuation of the Collective
Bargaining Process, 66 ClI.-KENT L. REV. 571, 593 n.10 (1990).

175. Jean Reed, GrievanceArbitrationAwards in the PublicSector: How Final in Florida?,35
U. MIAMI L. REv. 227,279 n.6 (1981).
176. Murphy, supranote 167, at 51-9. See also Thomas G. S. Christensen, JudicialReviewv:As

ArbitratorsSee It, in NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ABImATORS 99, 107 (Barbara D. Dennis et al. eds.,
1972).

177. 789 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
178. Id. at 2.

179. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (explaining that the privilege against selfincrimination guarantees an individual the right to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the
unfettered exercise of his own will during a period of custodial interrogation or other official
investigations).
180. American Postal Workers, 789 F.2d at 3.
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missal issue went to arbitration."8 ' The arbitrator ruled that the Post
Office did not have just cause for dismissal but that some discipline was
necessary because the employee failed to follow postal regulations."
After the arbitrator reduced the discharge to a disciplinary suspension, the
union brought an action in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia to enforce the award.18 3 The district court denied the union's
motion, s but on appeal the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
upheld the arbitrator's decision because it drew its essence from the
collective agreement' 5 The court found that an alleged mistake of
law (misapplication of the Mirandawarnings) does not alter the standard
of review; 6 that the Postal Service's alternative reading of the contract
was without merit;"s and that there was no violation of public policy
in reinstating this postal worker. 8
A similar decision was handed down the following year in Hill v.
Norfolk and Western Railway Co.'89 Mr. Hill was a railroad brakeman
who had been fired for possession of marijuana.19 He took the matter
to arbitration alleging a violation of the collective bargaining agreement. 1 ' When his claim was rejected, Mr. Hill brought suit in the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Louisiana. 92 The court
ruled against him, and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed the ruling.'" The court held that when a
federal court is asked to set aside an arbitration award, the question is not
whether the arbitrator erred in interpreting the contract, but whether the
' If the arbitrator interpreted the
arbitrator interpreted the contract.194
contract, the interpretation is conclusive. 95 By agreeing to an arbitration clause, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the parties agreed to be

181. Id.

182. Id. at 4.
183. American Postal IWorkers Union v. U.S. Postal Serv., 118 L.RR.M. (BNA) 2472 (D.D.C.
1985).
184. Id. at 2474.
185. American Postal Workers, 789 F.2d at 5.
186. Id. at 6.
187. Id. at 7.

188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at 8.
814 F.2d 1192 (7th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 1194.
Id.

192. Id.

193. Id. at 1194-95.
194. Id. at 1195.

195. Id.
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bound by the arbitrator's interpretation. 96
C.

Later Cases: Awards Set Aside

The discharge of a river boat captain was the focus of the Delta
Queen case.'97 The captain of the Mississippi Queen was discharged
after a near collision between his vessel and a tow of river barges. 999
The union filed a grievance, and the matter proceeded to arbitration.
The union contract specifically listed carelessness as a basis for discharge, and the arbitrator found the captain to be "grossly careless." 200
However, because the arbitrator also concluded that the Captain was the
victim of disparate company discipline, he ordered him reinstated, but as
a pilot 2 "' The company appealed the decision to the district court,
challenging the contractualauthority of the arbitrator to order reinstatement after finding gross carelessness. 2'
The court vacated the
arbitrator's order?0 3 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit, after citing the
essence standard from Enterprise Wheel, ° concluded that once the
captain was found to be grossly careless, the arbitrator had no authority
to order reinstatement. 02 5 The court reasoned that when arbitrators
exceed the limitations of their contractual mandate, judicial deference to
their decisions ends.2 "
2 °7 case
The issue in the Polk Brothers v. Chicago Truck Drivers
arose from the layoff of 163 employees following a fire which destroyed
a large portion of a warehouse.20 8 The union filed a grievance,
claiming that the decision violated the terms of three union-management
contracts.02 9 These contracts had expired on March 31, 1988, and the

196. Id. The court also sanctioned Mr. Hill's counsel for filing an appeal on frivolous grounds.

Id.at 1200.
197. Delta Queen Steamboat Co. v. District 2 Marine Eng'r Beneficial Ass'n, 889 F.2d 599 (5th

Cir. 1989).
198. Id. at 600.

199. Id. at 601.
200. Id.
201. Id.

202. Id.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id.
Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597.
Delta Queen, 889 F.2d at 604.
Id.
973 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1992).

208. Id. at 594. The fire caused the company to subcontract its warehousing and delivery
services. Id. at 595.
209. Id.
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following month, an arbitrator issued an award which reinstated the
employees with back pay.21 The Company challenged the back pay
remedy for the time beyond the expiration of the contracts.2
The
district court found that the "arbitrator exceeded his authority" 2 in
awarding post-contract expiration pay, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed
this ruling.2 3 Citing the essence test, the court stated that if the
arbitrator's words manifest infidelity to the collective bargaining
agreement, the courts must decline to enforce the award.2 14
D. Enforcement of Arbitration Awards in the Federal Sector
The federal courts have jurisdiction over labor matters that arise in
the federal government, including arbitration decisions.2 5 The bargaining law that applies to federal employees is Title VII of the Civil Service
Reform Act of 1978.216 This statute, which requires that grievance
procedures provide for binding arbitration, also provides for the review
of such decisions by the Federal Labor Relations Authority
5 and Cornelius v. Nutt2 9
(C'FLRA"')2 7 As the Devine v. Pastore"
cases below will show, the federal courts exercise sweeping powers of
review in cases involving federal employees.
The Devine case focused on a customs inspector who had been
removed from his position for theft after he was seen taking a shirt from
a cargo area and placing it in his car3
The union filed for arbitration,
and the arbitrator found that the grievant had indeed placed the shirt

210. Id.
211. Id. at 596.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 598-99.
214. Id. at 597.
215. 5 U.S.C. §7123 (1988).
216. Pub. L. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.
(1988)).
217. 5 U.S.C. § 7122(a) (1988). Section 7122(a) provides that either party to arbitration may
file an exception to any arbitrator's award with the FLRA. If the FLRA finds that the award is
deficient because (1) it is contrary to any law, rule, or regulation; or (2) on other grounds similar
to those applied by federal courts in the private sector, then the award may be set aside or modified.
Id. Between 1979 and 1988, 45% of the 1,516 exceptions to the awards of labor arbitrators filed
with the FLRA were modified. See James M. Harkless, FLRA Review ofArbitration Awards, 42
NATONAL ACADEMY OF ARBrmAToRs 204 (1990). For further discussion, see Charles J. Coleman,
FederalSector LaborRelations: A Reevaluation ofPolicies, 16 J. COLLEcT. NEGOTIATIONS PUB.
SECTOR 37 (1987).
218. 732 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
219. 472 U.S. 648 (1985).
220. Devine, 732 F.2d at 214.
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within his car" However, the arbitrator also found that removing the
Inspector was inconsistent with the policies of progressive discipline
contained in the bargaining agreement, and therefore reduced the
discipline to a thirty-one day suspension.mt
Not surprisingly, the
Office of Personnel Management sought judicial review before the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.' The appellate court
concluded that the arbitrator erred by substituting his idea of an
'appropriate penalty for that of the agency.2 4 The court also found that
he may have committed further error by considering only those factors
set forth in the agreement, while excluding other disciplinary factors
proscribed by federal personnel law.'
The case was remanded to the
226
arbitrator.
In Cornelius v. Nutt 7 two bargaining unit employees of the
General Services Administration ("GSA") were discharged from their
jobs for falsifying records. 8 The employees challenged their removal
under their contract's grievance procedure.
The arbitrator concluded
that the wrongdoing would normally justify removal but also found that
the GSA had committed a number of procedural errors (including failing
to provide union representation during interrogation), z0 After balancing the mistakes of both sides, the arbitrator decided that management
had failed to establish just cause for the discharges and reduced the
1
penalties to two week suspensions without pay.?
The court of appeals affirmed the award, 2 but the Supreme Court
reversed. 23 The Court held that a represented federal employee could
challenge disciplinary action either by appealing to the Merit Systems
Protection Board ("MSPB") or through the contractual grievance

221. Id.
222. Id. at 214-15.

223. Id. at 215. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit now has exclusive jurisdiction
over these appeals. See 5 U.S.C. §7703(b(1)(d) (1988)).
224. Devine, 732 F.2d at 217.
225. Id. at 218.
226. Id.
227. 472 U.S. 648 (1985).
228. Id. at 654.
229. Id. The collective bargaining agreement between GSA and the employees union provided
for binding arbitration. Id.
230. Id. at 655. It is important to note that the arbitrator did not find that the procedural errors
prejudiced the case. Id
231. Id.
232. Devine v. Nutt, 718 F.2d 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1983), rev'd, 472 U.S. 648 (1985).
233. Cornelius,472 U.S. at 665. The Court based its decision on the necessity for consistency
between the arbitration award and the MSPB on questions of law. Id. at 660-61.
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procedure? 4 However, the Court also held that arbitrators must use
the same interpretation as the MSPB in reviewing an agency's disciplinary action.2" In other words, grievants must show that the procedural
errors in question caused substantial prejudice to their rights and affected
the agency's decision.2 36
E. Enforcement of the Award and the Expansionist Paradigm
These eight cases -American Thread, Torrington,PostalWorkers,
provide
Hill, Delta Queen, Polk Brothers, Devine, and Corneliusonly a small sample of those brought to the courts in an attempt to set
aside an arbitration award on the basis of arbitrator error. However, they
show that despite the Supreme Court's admonition to ascertain only
"whether the party seeking arbitration is making a claim which on its
face is governed by the contract,'2 7 some of the lower courts may be
willing, perhaps even eager to take on the job of contract interpretation.
A court that holds that an arbitrator cannot reinstate a grievant found to
be grossly careless, as was the case in Delta Queen, has interpreted the
bargaining agreement2S A court that finds that an arbitrator exceeded
his or her authority in awarding benefits that accrued after the termination of the contract, as was the case in Polk Brothers, 9 has also
interpreted the contract?4 These cases imply, more generally, that the
lower courts have some reluctance about accepting the limited, minimalist role envisioned for the courts in the Trilogy.
V. DEVELOPING

THE EXPANsIONIsT

PARADIGM: PUBLIC POLICY

CASES

An arbitration award is supposed to be the last word on a subject.
Enterprise Wheel reinforced this idea when it held that the "plenary

234. Id. at 652. Under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, the grievant has a choice of
remedies. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
235. Cornelius,472 U.S. at 661.
236. See id. at 657-65.
237. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960).
238. Delta Queen Steamboat Co. v. District 2 Marine Eng'r Beneficial Ass'n, 889 F.2d 599 (5th
Cir. 1989). In addition, this case limited the arbitrator's ability to consider such "law of the shop"
factors as past practice. See Id.
239. Polk Bros. v. Chicago Truck Drivers, 973 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1992).
240. Id. at 597-98. It has also reached a different result on the same issue that the Supreme
Court decided in United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp. 363 U.S. 593
(1960).
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review by a court of the merits" of an arbitration award would destroy
the award's finality.241 However, arbitrators often deal with cases that
2 42
involve some combination of contractual rights and public policy.
Under the minimalist paradigm, an arbitration award should be immune
from judicial review on public policy grounds as long as it does not call
for the violation of a clear statutory principle or a widely acknowledged
principle of common law.243 The cases discussed in this section will
show that the minimalist approach has repeatedly prevailed in cases
pertaining to NLRB decisions to defer to an arbitrator's award, but that
in other areas, a more expansionist approach has taken hold. Beginning
in about 1974, the Supreme Court established a line of decisions which
broadened its standard of review in public policy cases and encouraged
the lower courts to adopt an even broader standard.2"
A.

Supporting the Minimalist Paradigm: NLRB Deferral Policies

The NLRB handles many cases in which matters of contract
interpretation are mingled with charges of unfair labor practices.245 For
241. Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 599.
242. This is the case in such areas as equal employment opportunity, occupational safety and
health, and others.
243. Bernard Meltzer, RuminationsAboutLawandLaborArbitration,20 NATIONAL ACADEMY
OF ABrRATORS 58 (1968); see also Robert G. Howlett, The Arbitrator,the NLRB, and the Courts,
20 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBnIRATORS 67 (1968). For further discussion, see Charles J.Morris,
NLRB Deferralto the ArbitrationProcess: The Arbitrator'sAwesome Responsibility,7 INDUS. REL
L.i. 290 (1985); Patricia A. Greenfield, The NLRB's Deferral to ArbitrationBefore andAfter Olin:
An EmpiricalAnalysis,42 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 34 (1988). For a list of citations, see LABOR
ARBITRATION iN AMERICA AN ANNOTATED BmuooRAPHY 51-54, 144-79 (Charles J. Coleman &
Theodora T. Haynes eds., ILR Press, 1994); see also James A. Gross & Patricia A. Greenfield,
Arbitral Value Judgments in Health andSafetyDisputes: Management Rights Over Workers' Rights,
34 BUFF.L. Rnv. 645, 674-75 (1985). Some scholars have laid out the position in the form of atwo
part test: (1) is the asserted public policy clearly defined in law and legal precedent; and (2) does
the arbitration award create any specific conflict with that policy. See Joan Parker, JudicialReview
of LaborArbitrationAwards: Misco andIts Impact on the Public Policy Exception, 4 LAB. LAw.
683 (1988); see also Harry T. Edwards, JudicialReview of LaborArbitration Awards: The Clash
Between the PublicPolicy Exception and the Duty to Bargain, 64 CH.-KENT L. REv. 3 (1988).
244. Alexanderv. Gardner Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). For discussion see infra notes 30322 and accompanying text.
245. See generallyTextron Lycoming, 310 N.L.R.B. 1209 (1993) (holding where an employer
and union voluntarily elect to resolve disputes through final and binding arbitration, the Board will
not intervene prior to an honest attempt by the parties to resolve their disputes with arbitration);
Environmental Consultants, 310 N.L.R.B. 184 (1993) (finding that the respondent company engaged
in an unfair labor practice when it tried to change the terms of the contract unilaterally); August A.
Busch & Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 714 (1992) (holding that although a contract does not obligate either
party to resort to grievance arbitration, where arbitration is available, the Board will hold the unfair
labor practice in abeyance, pending arbitration); Interstate Material Corp., 290 N.L.R.B. 362 (1988)
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example, an employer may violate the contract and commit an unfair
labor practice when it unilaterally changes working conditions246 or

where it disciplines a union officer more severely than other employees

47

The NLRB has followed two policies of restraint when an

employee's grievance overlaps an unfair labor practice charge. The first
policy concerns arbitration awards that have already been rendered (postarbitration deferral) and the second involves eases which have not yet

been arbitrated (pre-arbitration deferral).248 The effect of each policy
was to give the arbitrator the ability to resolve both the statutory matter
and the grievance. The courts have consistently supported the NLRB's
deferral policies.24 9

Post-Arbitration Deferral: Spielberg. 5 -- The Spielberg case,
decided five years before the Trilogy, concerned a company's refusal to
reinstate four strikers 1 The union had taken the dispute to arbitra-

tion, and the arbitrator sustained the discharges on the basis of strike
misconduct.
The union then took the case to the NLRB as a violation of the anti-discrimination policy of Section 8(a)(3) of the
NLRA?' 3 The Board dismissed the complaint, and in the process

established its first formal deferral policy.3'
It announced that it
would defer to an arbitrator's resolution of an unfair labor practice claim
if (1) the arbitration proceedings were fair and regular; (2) the parties
agreed to be bound by the award; and (3) the award was not clearly

(finding that the collective bargaining agreement signed by the company and the first union did not
expire, and therefore, the company violated sections 8(a)(1) and (2) when it recognized and entered
into a contract with a second union).
246. See generally ROBERT A. GORIMaN, BASIc TEX ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 496-531 (1976).
247. Td at 326-39.
248. For representative discussions of the Board's deferral policies see Morris, supra note 243,
at 290; Harry T. Edwards, Deferral to Arbitrationand Waiver of the Duty to Bargain: A Possible
Way Out of EverlastingConfiusion at the NLRB, 46 OmO ST. L. 23 (1985); Jan NV.Henkel and
Mark Kelly, Deferral to Arbitration: After Olin andUnited Technologies: Has the NLRB Gone too
Far? 43 WAH. & LEE L. REv. 37 (1986); Thomas L. Kittle-Kamp, Further Convolutions in a
Convoluted Policy: Olin, Taylor, and NLRB Deferral toArbitralDecisions, 82 NV. U. L. REv. 443
(1987); Mary H. Moses, Deferral to Arbitration in Individual Rights Cases: A Re-Examination of
Spielberg, 51 TENN. L. REv. 187 (1984).
249. See, e-g., Hammontree v. NLRB, 925 F.2d 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
250. Spielberg Mfg., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
251. Id. at 1081.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 1080. Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act makes discrimination
against an employee with regard to hire or tenure of employment in order to discourage or encourage
union membership an unfair labor practice. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988).
254. Spielbeig, 112 N.L.R.B. at 1082.
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repugnant to the purposes and policies of the NLRA.25 s In 1964, the
Raytheon2sS case added a fourth consideration: that the unfair labor
practice issue was presented to and considered by the arbitrator.25 7
The doctrine of post-arbitration deferral went through expansion and
contraction over the years, 2 8 arriving at its current state in 1984 with
the Board's decision in Olin Corp.25 9 Olin returned to the Spielberg
standards but it added to them in three ways. First, the Board determined that the arbitrator will have considered the unfair labor practice
issue adequately if the contractual issue is factually parallel to the
statutory issue, and the arbitrator was presented with the facts about the
statutory violation.2
Second, the Board :will defer to an arbitrator's
decision unless it is "palpably wrong," that is, not susceptible to an
interpretation inconsistent with the Act.2 1 Finally, the NLRB shifted
the burden of proof; the party arguing against deferral now bears the
262
burden of showing that the arbitration process was defective.
Although the courts have periodically questioned the Board's policies in
this area, or indicated a desire for some specific change, they generally
have supported the Board's policies.2 63
The rationale for the Board's deferral policy was laid out in Darr
v. NLR 264 - a case that involved back pay following reinstatement
from a discharge.2 6 As stated by the court, the deferral policy rested
on four concepts:

255. Id.
256. Raytheon Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 883, set asideon othergrounds, 326 F.2d 471 (Ist. Cir. 1964).
257. Id. at 884-87.
258. It expanded in Electronic Reprod. Serv., 213 N.L.R.B. 758 (1974) (Where the Board decided
to defer to the award although the complainant failed to present evidence relevant to the unfair labor
practice). The doctrine was contracted in Suburban Motor Freight, 247 N.L.R.B. 14 (1980) (holding
that deferral would not be granted unless the award demonstrated that the arbitrator ruled on the
statutory issue). See Henkel & Kelly, supra note 248, at 40-43.
259. 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984).
260. Id. at 574. Embedded appears to be a better word than parallel. Conceptually, the same
facts gave rise to both the grievance and the unfair labor practice claim.
261. Id. In a sense this signals a return to the 1962 InternationalHarvesterpolicy, in which the
Board reaffirmed the Spielberg criteria and announced that it would defer to an arbitrator's decision
unless it was "palpably wrong" or the arbitration itself appeared to be tainted by fraud, collusion,
unfairness, or serious procedural irregularities. See International Harvester, 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 929
(1962).
262. Olin, 268 N.L.R.B. at 575.
263. See, eg., Taylor v. NLRB, 786 F.2d 1516, 1521 (11th Cir. 1986) (expressing that the Olin

standard was inadequate to protect employee's statutory rights).
264. 801 F.2d 1404 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
265. Id. Dar was a low level union official who alleged that she had been discharged for union
activity. She was reinstated but without back pay. Id. at 1405-06.
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The first is a collateral estoppel theory - the notion that the NLRA
issue is sufficiently close to the contract question as to have been fully
litigated; the second is that the Board applies a limited scope of review
as if it were an appellate body reviewing an arbitrator's application of
the NLRA (presumably as incorporated in the [labor] agreement); the
third involves deference to a contract interpretation upon which the
application of the NLRA depends; and the fourth is the theory that the
parties to a collective bargaining agreement have waived the statutory
rights that the Board is empowered to enforce and instead rely on a
different body of contract law 66
Pre-Arbitration Deferral: Collyer3--This 1971 case occurred
after an employer made a number of unilateral changes in pay rates and
job assignments during the term of the bargaining agreement.2
The
employer offered to arbitrate the complaints, but the union chose to bring
the issue to the Board as an unfair labor practice case369 The Board
used this case to state its policy on cases that had not yet been arbitrated.
It announced that it would require exhaustion of the grievance procedure,
including arbitration, before it would consider unfair labor practice claims
provided that: (1) there was a long standing bargaining relationship; (2)
there was no enmity by the employer toward the employees; (3) the
employer was willing to arbitrate; (4) the arbitration clause covered the
dispute; and (5) the contract and its meaning were at the center of the
dispute.27 Where the contract:
[C]learly provides for grievance and arbitration machinery, where the
unilateral action taken is not designed to undermine the Union and
is... based on a substantial claim of contractual privilege, and it
appears that the arbitral interpretation of the contract will resolve both
the unfair labor practice issue and the contract interpretation issue in a
manner compatible with the purposes of the Act, then the Board should

266. Id. at 1408. The NLRB cases that frame the Board's deferral policy are set forth in

footnote six of Darr. Judge Harry T. Edwards of the D.C. Circuit argued that the parties to collective bargaining agreements are free to modify or alter many statutory rights "subject always to the
duty of fair representation, the requirement that the union in no way impair the employees' right to
choose their own bargaining agent, and the obligation of the parties to adhere to certain mandatory
provisions of the Act." See Edwards, supra,note 243, at 37. See also Douglas E.Ray, Individual
Rights and NLRB Deferralto the ArbitrationProcess:A Proposal,28 B.C. L. REv. 1 (1986).
267. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
26S. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 842.
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defer to the arbitration clause....27
Collyer developed in the same winding way as Spielberg. It was
extended to other unfair labor practice areas in National Radio Co.,2v2
which was overruled in GeneralAmerican Transportation Corp.,273 and
was later reversed in United Technologies.74 In United Technologies,
the Board decided that companies and unions should use their negotiated
grievance and arbitration procedures before appealing to the Board. 2
An example of judicial enforcement of the Collyer/UnitedTechnologies
policy can be found in Hammontree v. NLRB.276 Mr. Hammontree
challenged an NLRB order that required him to exhaust his grievance
remedies before the Board would consider his unfair labor practice
complaint.2 77 He contended that this requirement was inconsistent with
the NLRB's statutory authority2 78 The United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia found that the NLRB could require an
employee to exhaust his grievance remedies before filing an unfair
practice charge 9 Hammontree's petition for review was denied."'
For more than forty years, the NLRB has followed a policy of
deferring to arbitration awards when statutory unfair labor practice claims
are mingled with contractual grievances.2 8 The Board has ordered
arbitration under the Collyer doctrine,282 and it has bowed to existing
283 The Board has deferred in a
arbitration awards under Spielberg.
broad range of matters, including cases on the refusal to bargain and
cases that addressed such individual rights as freedom from interference,
restraint, coercion, and discrimination.2 ' The Board has deferred to

271. Id. at 841 (citing Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 175 N.L.R.B. 141 (1969)).
272. 198 N.L.R.B. 527 (1972). compare Spielberg, 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955) (refusal to
bargain an unfair labor practice under 8(a)(5)) with NationalRadio(an 8(a)(3) interference, restraint,
and coercion case).

273. General Am. Transp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808, 810 (1977).
274. United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984) (issued on the same day as Olin
Corp.). For a discussion of Olin and UnitedTechnologies, see Edwards, supra note 243, at 26-27.
275. 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984).

276.
277.
278.
279.

894 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1990), vacated on reh'g, 925 F.2d 1486 (1991).
Hammontree, 925 F.2d at 1488.
Id.
Id.

280. Id.
281. See, e-g., Spielberg Mfg., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
282. See, eg., August A. Busch & Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 714 (1992).

283. See, e.g., Malrite, 198 N.L.R.B. 241 (1972).
284. See General Am. Transp., 227 N.L.R.B. 1695, 1696 (1977) (Chairman Murphy's dissent
distinguished cases involving collective bargaining, where she had no difficulty signing on to a
policy of deferral and cases involving individual rights where she felt that arbitrator's decisions
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28
arbitration with great frequency,
28 6
decisions.
supported the Board's

and the courts have. generally

B. Judicial Review when there is a Breach in the Duty of Fair
Representation ("DFR")
DFR is a judicially created obligation that requires the union to

represent all employees in the bargaining unit fairly?' It was established against the backdrop of racial discrimination cases during the
1940s 88 From an arbitration/public policy perspective, the important
question centers on whether this obligation poses a threat to the finality
of awards.

The courts have concluded that a proven breach in the DFR may
justify setting aside an award?89

When several employees of the

Anchor Motor Freight Company were fired for filing false expense
vouchers, the union claimed that they were innocent and submitted the
matter to arbitration.29 The arbitration committee upheld the discharges, but when subsequent information indicated that the charges might
have been false, the grievants brought a wrongful-discharge suit against
the employer and the union under Section 301 of the LMRA? 9 They
claimed that the falsity of the charges could have been discovered with

very little investigation, and the union failed in its duty of fair represen"
tation because it made no effort to ascertain the truth?92
The district court granted summary judgment for the union,293 but
would not resolve the statutory issues).
285. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 581 (1984), (Zimmerman, dissenting). In Zimmerman's
dissent, agency statistics were cited to demonstrate that between October 1, 1981 and December,
1983, more than 3,800 cases had been deferred under the rules governing pre- and post-arbitral
deferral. Id.
286. Problems arose ascertaining whether the arbitrator actually heard and decided the unfair
labor practice portions of the case. See, eg., Taylor v. NLRB, 786 F.2d 1516, 1521-22 (11th Cir.
1986) (rejecting Olin standards because they created the presumption that all arbitral proceedings
confront and resolve each unfair practice, unless proven otherwise). The court concluded that this
presumption "cannot be reconciled with the need to protect statutory rights:' Id at 1522. See also
Kittle-Kamp, supra note 248, at 446.
287. Clyde W. Summers, The Individual Employee's Rights under the Collective Agreement:
What Constitutes FairRepresentation, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 251, 253 (1977).
288. See Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
289. See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
290. d. at 577.
291. Id. at 558; see also 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988).
292. Hines, 424 U.S. at 558.
293. Hines v. Local 377, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 72 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) 9113,987, at 28,132
(N.D.Ohio Sept. 25, 1973), ard,506 F.2d 1153 (6th Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom., Hines v. Anchor
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the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concluded that there were
sufficient facts to infer bad faith or arbitrary conduct on the union's
part.294 The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision in favor
of the union, but upheld the judgment as to the employer because there

was no showing of misconduct by the employer or of a conspiracy
between the employer and the union.295 The United States Supreme

Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's decision,
holding that it was improper
29 6
to dismiss the suit against the employer.
A breach of the DFR relieves the employee of any requirement that
disputes be settled through contractual procedures. 297 Furthermore, if
it is proven that this breach tainted the arbitrator's decision, the award is

not final and the complainant is entitled to a remedy from both the
employer and the union. 29s However, ifa breach of the DF. isnot
proven, the arbitration award is final.2 99

Motor Freight. Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
294. Hines v. Local 377, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 506 F.2d 1153, 1155 (6th Cir. 1974), rev'd
sub nom., Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
295. Hines, 506 F.2d at 1157-58.
296. Hines, 424 U.S. at 570-72.
297. See 29 U.S.C. § 185 (a) (1988) ("Suits for violation ofcontracts between an employer and
a labor organization ...may be brought in any district court ofthe United States havingjurisdiction
of the parties. ..

298. See Bowen v. United States Postal Ser., 459 U.S. 212,223 (1983). Bowen was discharged
as a result of an altercation with another employee. Id. at 214. He filed a grievance and when the
union declined to take the case to arbitration, he sued both the Postal Service and the union in the
United States district court. Id. The court held that the discharge had been without just cause and
that the union had- handled his grievance in an arbitrary manner. Id at 216. The damages were
divided between the Postal Service and the union. Idat 216-17. The Fourth Circuit affirmed except
for the award of damages against the union. Id at 217. The Supreme Court held that where an
employee proves that his employer violated a collective bargaining agreement and the union
breached its duty of fair representation, liability is to be apportioned between the employer and the
union according to the damages caused by the fault of each. Id. at 222-23.
299. See generally Alford v. General Motors Corp., 926 F.2d 528 (6th Cir. 1991). Plaintiffs
were temporary employees who were members of the security guards bargaining unit. Id. at 529.
When General Motors refused to offer them permanent positions, they filed a grievance. Id. When
no settlement was reached, they sued the company for its failure to offer them permanent positions
and the union on DFR grounds. Id. at 530. The U.S. district court dismissed the suits, and the
plaintiffs appealed. Id. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision. Id. at 531. The claimants were
unable to show a breach of the DFR, and thus the Sixth Circuit held that the grievance procedures
in the bargaining agreement were final and exclusive. Id. Once the union was let out of the
litigation on the DFR grounds, the employees could not maintain a direct breach of contract action
against General Motors. Id.
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C. Establishing the Expansionist Paradigm in Public Policy Cases:
GardnerDenver, 1974
Soon after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,300 it
became apparent that there was a potential conflict between the rights
guaranteed under this statute and those secured by the arbitration clause
of a collective bargaining agreement?"1 In practice, some arbitrators
have tried to avoid the conflict by focusing on the law, while other
arbitrators have concentrated on the contract.3 02 In the 1974 case of
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,3 3 the contractual agreement to
arbitrate needed to be reconciled with Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act.P3
The US. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in this case,
establishing a line of thought that would persist into the 1990s.
Mr. Alexander was an African-American employee.30 5 He had
been employed as a drill operator trainee and was terminated for
producing too many defective and unusable parts.30 6 After Mr. Alexander was discharged from his position, he filed a grievance under the nondiscrimination clause in the collective bargaining agreement.0 7 Before
the grievance could reach arbitration, he filed a racial discrimination
complaint under Title VII of the Civil Rights Ace with the Colorado
Civil Rights Commission which referred the complaint to the EEOC3 9
He lost in both venues: the arbitrator found just cause for the discharge
and the EEOC determined that there was no basis for believing that a
violation of Title VII had occurred.3 t0 Then, he brought an action in
300. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1994). Title VII provided a number of

protections for employees who were victims of employment discrimination as a result oftheir race,
religion, gender, or ethnic origin. Id. Other statutes have extended similar protection to age and
disabilities. Sea eg., Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp.
V 1994); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V. 1994).

301. Patricia A. Greenfield, How Do ArbitratorsTreat ExternalLmv?, 45 INDus. & LAB. REL.
REV. 683, 685-86 (1992) (citing David E. Feller, The Coming End ofArbitration'sGolden Age, in
Proceedings of the 29th Annual Meeting of the NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBn-T rTORS 97, 97-126
(Barbara D. Dennis & Gerald G. Somers eds., 1976)).
302. Mark D. Greenbaurn, Arbitrationand the Civil Rights Laws, in LABOR AND EMIPLOYMNT

ARBaRATION 53 (Tim Bornstein & Ann Gosline eds., 1995).
303. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
304. See generallyid.
305. Id. at 38.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 39.
308. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
309. Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 42.
310. Id. at 42-43.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1995

35

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 1
[Voel. 13:1
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

U.S. district court claiming that his termination was due to a racially
The court held that the
discriminatory employment practice."'
petitioner was bound by the arbitration and had no right to sue under
Title VII.3 12 The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision.3 13
However, the Supreme Court reversed this decision and established
two principles in the process.314 The first pertains to an employee's
statutory right to trial de novo under Title VII. 31 5 Does the existence
of an arbitration provision in a collective bargaining agreement bar
access to statutory remedies? The Court determined that this right is not
foreclosed by prior submission of the claim to arbitration.3 16 There are
different tracks for different rights. Statutory or Constitutional rights are
to be enforced in the courts and contractual rights through arbitra3 17

tion.

In submitting his grievance to arbitration, an employee seeks to
vindicate his contractual right under a collective-bargaining agreement.
By contrast, in filing a lawsuit under Title VII, an employee asserts
independent statutory rights accorded by Congress. The distinctly
separate nature of these contractual and statutory rights is not vitiated
merely because both were violated as a risult of the same factual
occurrence and certainly no inconsistency results from permitting both
rights to be enforced in their respectively appropriate forums.3 "
The second principle concerned the status of arbitration awards in
public policy cases3 9 Although the lower courts held that the Trilogy
cases limited the extent of court review,"' the Gardner-DenverCourt
concluded that when matters of public policy are at issue, the employee's
claim should be reviewed de novo, the arbitration award may be
reviewed in its entirety, and the weight given to the arbitrator's decision

311. Id. at 43.

312. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 346 F. Supp. 1012, 1019 (D. Colo. 1971), aff'd, 466
F.2d 1209 (10th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
313. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 466 F.2d 1209, 1210 (10th Cir. 1972), rev'd,415 U.S.

36 (1974).
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 60.
Id. at 38.
Id. at49.
Id. at 49-50.
Id.
Id. at 56-58.
Id. at 45-46.
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is within the court's discretion.3 "
We adopt no standards as to the weight to be accorded an arbitral
decision, since this must be determined in the court's discretion with
regard to the facts and circumstances of each case ....
Where an
arbitral determination gives full consideration to an employee's Title
VII rights, a court may properly accord it great weight. This is
especially true where the issue is one solely of fact, specifically
addressed by the parties and decided by the arbitrator on the basis of
an adequate record. But courts should ever be mindful that Congress ... thought it necessary to provide a judicial forum for the
ultimate resolution of discriminatory employment claims. It is the duty
of courts to assure the full availability of this forum 3
D.

Delineating the Boundary in Public Policy Cases: W R.

Grace'" and Misco 24

Having established a broad principle pertaining to court review in
public policy cases, in W R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, International
Union of Rubber Workers, the United States Supreme Court determined
that it would only apply that principle on a narrow basis.3 This case
began with a conciliation agreement that the employer had signed with
the EEOC.32 6 The agreement provided that certain seniority provisions

of the collective bargaining agreement would be superseded by a genderbased quota system?27 The union did not participate in the conciliation
agreement and when the employer attempted to enforce it, the union
objected and demanded arbitration" 28 The employer responded by
filing suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Mississippi to enjoin the arbitration of grievances over the layoff?"9
The district court held that the conciliation agreement should prevail, but
on appeal from the union, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

321. Id. at 59-60.
322. Id. at 60 n.21.
323. NV.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Int'l Union of Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
324. Misco, Inc. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 768 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 484
U.S. 29 (1987).
325. W. R. Grace,461 U.S. at 764.
326. Id. at 759.
327. Id. at 760.
328. Id. at 759-60.
329. Id. at 760. See also Southbridge Plastics Div. v. Local 759, Int'l Union of Rubber Workers,
403 F. Supp. 1183 (N.D. Miss. 1975), rev'd, 565 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1978).
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determined that the seniority provision should control, and it ordered
reinstatement and back pay for the laid-off employees? °
The back pay issue arose before the Supreme Court. 331 There had
been two arbitrations on grievances for back pay.332 The first arbitrator
denied back pay because it would be unfair to penalize the employer for
complying with the order of a district court.333 The second arbitrator
rejected the employer's argument that the first decision was binding.334
This arbitrator awarded back pay because the collective bargaining
agreement made no exceptions for good-faith violations of the contract,
even if they were based upon a court order.335 The employer brought
suit to vacate the second arbitration award.336 The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the employer, 337 but the Fifth
Circuit held that the second arbitrator was not bound by the first decision
and ordered that his award be enforced.3
The Supreme Court affirmed this decision,339 and in the process
made two points which tie into the themes of this article. First, in
accordance with the minimalist concepts advanced by the Trilogy, the
Court concluded that a federal court may not overturn an arbitrator's
decision simply because it believes that its own interpretation of the
bargaining agreement is better.34 The second arbitrator's award drew
its essence from the contract 41 The second contribution ties into the
current discussion of the relationship between arbitration and public
policy. The employer argued that upholding the second arbitrator's
award would compromise the public policy that mandates obedience to
a court order.342 The Court disagreed343 and went on to provide more

330. See Southbridge Plastics,565 F.2d at 917.

331. W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 759.
332. Id. at 762.
333. Id.

334. Id. at 763.
335. Id. at 763-64.
336. W. R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Int'l Union of Rubber Workers, 652 F.2d 1248, 1252 (Sth
Cir. 1981), affrd, 461 U.S. 757 (1983).

337. Id. at 1251 (citing Southbridge Plastics Div. v. Local 759, Int'l Union of Rubber workers,
403 F. Supp. 1183 (N.D. Miss. 1975), aftd,461 U.S. 757 (1983)).
338. Id. at 1257-58.

339. W. R. Grace,461 U.S. at 764. The circuit court also concluded that the first arbitrator had
exceeded his authority and had based his decision on equitable considerations rather than contractual
ones. IV.R. Grace, 652 F.2d at 1255, 1257.
340. W. . Grace, 461 U.S. at 764.
341. Id. at 765-66.
342. See id. at 766.
343. Id. at 767.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol13/iss1/1

38

Coleman and Coleman: Toward a New Paradigm of Labor Arbitration in the Federal Courts

1995l

Toward A New Paradigm Of Labor Arbitration

specific guidance as to the kind of public policy that could lead to the
plenary review mentioned in Gardner-Denver3" This kind of public
policy "is to be ascertained 'by reference to the laws and legal precedents
and not from general considerations of supposed public interests."' 345
The public policy must be "well defined and dominant."346
The definition of public policy surfaced again in the 1987 decision
of United PaperworkersInternational Union v. Misco, Inc.347 Misco
did not establish new law but it reinforced W R. Grace and reaffirmed
the power of arbitral fact-finding. 4 One of the Misco work rules
listed the possession or use of controlled substances on company property
as cause for discharge.3 4 9 Isaiah Cooper was apprehended by police in
the back seat of another person's car on the company's parking lot3 5
The smell of marijuana was in the air and a lit marijuana cigarette was
found in the front seat ashtray.3 1 Cooper did not own the car, and two
other Misco employees were seen leaving it shortly before his arrest.352
After being discharged for violating the company's controlled substances
rules, he promptly filed a grievance 53
The case was submitted to arbitration, where the arbitrator reversed
the discharge and ordered reinstatement2'
He concluded that the
presence of marijuana in the front seat ashtray of another person's car
did not prove that it belonged to Cooper who was in the back seat or that
Cooper was smoking it.35 The company tried to introduce evidence
about discovering marijuana gleanings in the grievant's car, but the
arbitrator disallowed it because the company was not aware of this
evidence when it discharged him. 56 On appeal from the company, the
district court vacated the award?' 7 The Fifth Circuit, adopting the
reasoning of the district court, affirmed the decision holding that

344. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
345. W.R. Grace,461 U.S. at 766 (quoting Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49,66 (1945)).
346. Id.
347. 484 U.S. 29 (1987).
348. Id. at 43-45.
349. Id. at 32.
350. Id. at 33.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 34.
355. Id.
356. Id. The arbitrator stated that the company had to have "proof in hand" before taking action.
Id. at n.6.
357. Misco, Inc. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 768 F.2d 739,740 (5th Cir. 1985), rev'd,
484 U.S. 29 (1987).
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reinstatement would violate the public policy against the operation of
dangerous machinery by persons under the influence of drugs. 358 The
court also held that the arbitrator erred when he refused 3to
hear the
59
evidence about the marijuana residue in the employee's car.
The Supreme Court reversed, 6 holding that the Fifth Circuit's
review exceeded its limited authority3 61 The Supreme Court concluded
that the Fifth Circuit erred in second-guessing the arbitrator's evidentiary
ruling.36 Absent fraud by the parties or an arbitrator's misconduct, the
courts are not authorized to reconsider the merits of an arbitrator's
award,3 63 and the arbitrator's finding of facts is conclusive.3 64 A
court's refusal to enforce an arbitrator's interpretation of a bargaining
agreement on public policy grounds is limited to the situations outlined
in W R. Grace 65 The policy is to be "explicit," "well-defined,"
"dominant," and "to be ascertained 'by reference to the laws and legal
precedents
' 3 and not from general considerations of supposed public

interest. ,,
E.

66

The Supreme Court's Extension of the Expansionist Paradigm to
New Areas

The Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA)'92 6 -- Seven years after
Gardner-Denver,the Supreme Court began the process of extending its
principles to other areas of public policy. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight System, Inc.,
focused on the FLSA.3 69 The employees
claimed that they were entitled to payment for time spent inspecting and
transporting vehicles to a repair facility 7 0 The claims were submitted
to a joint grievance committee, which rejected them without explana-

358. Id. at 743.
359.
360.
361.
362.

Id.
United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987).
Id. at 36-38.
I1d. at 39.

363. Id. at 38.
364. Id. "To resolve disputes about the application of a collective-bargaining agreement, an

arbitrator must find facts and a court may not reject those findings simply because it disagrees with
them."
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.

Id.
Id. at 43.
Id. (quoting Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945)).
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
450 U.S. 728 (1981).
Id. at 729-30.
Id. at 730-31.
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court alleging that the
tion.37t The petitioners filed an action in district
37 2
claims were compensable under the FLSA.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

concluded that the petitioners' voluntary submission of grievances to
arbitration barred them from asserting their statutory claims in a
subsequent court action? 7 3 However, the Supreme Court, following

Gardner-Denver,reversed this ruling.374 It held that FLSA rights are
independent of the collective bargaining process.375 Such rights belong

to the petitioners as individual workers, not as members of a union, and
cannot be waived.3 76 Courts should defer to an arbitrator's decision
where the employee's claim is based on rights arising out of a bargaining

agreement, but different considerations apply when the claim is based on
rights arising from a law that provides substantive guarantees to
individual workers. 3
The Civil Rights Act of 1871.37 8 -The next significant Supreme

Court decision on the public policy exception is tied into the portion of
Gardner-Denver,79 where the Court stated that arbitral fact-finding

would not be given resjudicataor collateral estoppel effect in a Title
VII suit.3 " The case of McDonald v. West Branch clarified the court's
position on this issue.38' McDonald was discharged from his job on

371. Id. at 731.
372. Id. at 731-32. There were two issues in this case. The first involved the union's duty of
fair representation and the second dealt with compensation under the FLSA. Id. at 733. The district
court's decision dealt only with the first issue. Id.
373. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 615 F.2d 1194, 1199 (8th Cir. 1980), rev'd,
450 U.S. 728 (1981). The court affirmed the district court's ruling on the duty offair representation,
and also held that it was correct in not addressing the merits of the FLSA case. Id. at 1202. It
concluded that wage disputes under the FLSA may be resolved in binding arbitration. Id. at 1199.
374. Barrentinev. Arkansas-Best FreightSys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 745.46 (1981).
375. Id. at 745.
376. Id. However, several years before the Barrentinedecision, the 10th Circuit ruled that an
employee's right to sue for overtime under the FLSA was foreclosed by prior arbitration.
Satterwhite v. United Parcel Serv., 496 F.2d 448 (10th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 419 U.S. 1079
(1974). See generally Timothy J.Heinsz, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: The
Enterprise Wheel Goes Around and Around, 52 Mo. L. REV. 243 (1987).
377. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 743-44. There was a strong dissent from Justices Berger and
Rehnquist based on notions of judicial economy. See id. at 747.48. The Justices argued that
individual rights considerations might prevail over an arbitration award in a matter such as racial
discrimination, but not in the less significant matter of wage claims. Id. at 749.
378. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). This section of the Act protects individuals who are deprived
of any "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution ...:'Id.
379. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
380. Id. at 49.
381. 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
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the city police force because of alleged political activity. 82 Challenging the discharge, he -went to arbitration under the just cause provision
of the bargaining agreement.3 83 He lost at arbitration, but instead of
appealing the decision, he filed an action in district court in which he
claimed a violation of his rights under the Civil Rights Act of 1871."
The jury returned a verdict against the Chief of Police385 but the Court
of Appeals reversed the verdict.3 86 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that
McDonald's claims were barred because they had been resolved in
arbitration.3" The Supreme Court later reversed the appellate decision,
limiting the res judicata or collateral estoppel effect of an arbitration
award under a collective bargaining agreement.388 Where the claim is
based on an independent statutory right, the Court held that the claimant
may proceed to perfect such right through judicial channels.389

Workers' Compensation.--Duringthe 1980's, the Supreme Court
also dealt with the relationship between state law and the LMRA. The
case of Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc.39 involved the
discharge of a worker for filing a false workers' compensation claim.39 '
The union grieved and, while arbitration was proceeding, the employee
382. Id. at 285-86.
383. Id. at 286.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 286-87.
388. Id. at 287. The Court gave four reasons for refusing to give preclusive effect to the
arbitration award: (1) the arbitrator's expertise was in the law of the shop rather than the law of the
land; (2) arbitrators may lack authority to enforce statutes because their authority is derived only
from the contract; (3) the union may sacrifice the individual's statutory rights in the interests of the
bargaining unit as a whole; and (4) limitations in arbitral fact-finding. Id. at 284. See also Craig
Dow Patton, NLRB Deferral to Arbitration: PlacingIndividualEmployees' StatutoryRights Upon
the SacrificialAltar of Olin to Promote a NationalLaborPolicyFavoringPrivateDispute Resolu.
don, 21 . MARSHALL L. REV. 323 (1988). Other authors have indicated that inadequate remedies
available at arbitration might pose an additional shortcoming. See, eg., James I. Briggs, Jr., The
NationalLabor RelationsBoard'sPolicy ofDeferringto Arbitration, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1141,
1165 (1986).
389. See Barrentine,450 U.S. at 737; see also Harding v. United States Postal Serv., 802 F.2d.
766 (4th Cir. 1986). In Harding,the appellants were former postal service employees who had been
discharged for filing false injury compensation claims. Id. at 767. The second appellant was also
discharged for failing to meet the physical requirements of his position. Id. After their discharges
were upheld in arbitration, they filed suit alleging lack of due process. Id. The district court
dismissed their claims concluding that such a Constitutional remedy was not available as they had
other procedures available for redress. Id. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the grievants
could not seek a private cause of action against the postal service for the alleged Constitutional
violations. Id. at 768.
390. 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
391. Id. at 401.
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filed a retaliatory discharge action in state court.3 92 The employer
removed the suit to the district court on the basis of diversity of
citizenship and filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the case was
preempted by Section 301 of the LMRA 93 The district court dismissed the complaint because it was arbitrable under the collective
bargaining agreement.3 94
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the decision,39 5 but the Supreme Court held that the application of the
employee's state tort remedy was not preempted by the LMRA 3 96 The
application of state law is preempted by Section 301 only if it requires
the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement 97 Under
Illinois law, in cases of retaliatory discharge for workers' compensation
abuse, the employee must show that the discharge or the threat of
discharge was prompted by a desire to deter the employee from
exercising rights under the Workers Compensation Act.3 98 Because
these elements do not require interpretation of the union-management
contract, the retaliatory discharge claim is independent of the agreement.399 "The interpretation of collective . bargaining agreements
remains firmly in the arbitral realm"4 " and judges may only determine
questions of state law that involve labor-management relations if such
questions do not require construction of those agreements4 !
F. The Expansionist Paradigm in the Circuit Courts: Public and
Employee Safety
10 2
Delta Air Lines,4°
The next five cases - Northwest Airlines,.
4°5
40
and United States Postal SerIowa Electric, " Stead Motors,

392. Id. at 402.
393. Id.
1985).
394. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 1448, 1449-50 (S.D. Ill.
395. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 823 F.2d 1031, 1046 (7th Cir. 1987).
396. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 407.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 411.
401. Id.
402. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 808 F2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1014 (1988).
403. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 861 F.2d 665 (11th Cir. 1988), reh'g
denied, 867 F.2d 1431 (11th Cir. 1989), and cert. denied, 493 U.S. 871 (1989).
404. Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Local 204, IBEW, 834 F.2d 1424 (8th Cir. 1987).
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vice"' - involve circuit court of appeals decisions on arbitration
awards in cases where contractual matters and public or employee safety
are commingled. 4 °7 The first two cases to be discussed involve a
mixture of public policy with alcohol, public safety, and airline
pilots.40 8 They surfaced in the circuit courts around the time of the
Misco decision.4 9 The petitioners in both cases were airline employers.410 In each case, a pilot was discharged for flying while under the
influence of alcohol!" The blood alcohol level of the pilots was 0.13
percent in each case, where the state law had established 0.10 percent as
creating a presumption of intoxication.412
In Northwest Airlines, the grievant was a co-pilot who was second
in command of the aircraft.4 13 The arbitration board's ruling was tied
into the grievant's status as a recovering alcoholic.414 The arbitration
board ruled that he should be offered reinstatement without back pay or
benefits upon certification by the Federal Air Surgeon that he had
recovered from his alcoholism. 415 The pilot completed the program

and when he was recertified for flight status by the Federal Aeronautics
Agency, the airline filed a complaint in the district court seeking to set
aside the reinstatement order.4 6 The court found for the employer on
the grounds that the Board's award was inconsistent with public
policy.417 However, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals

405. Stead Motors v. Automotive Machinists Lodge No. 1173, 843 F.2d 357 (9th Cir. 1988),
reh'g en banc, 886 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1989), andcert. denied, 495 U.S. 946 (1990).
406. United States Postal Serv. v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 839 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1988).
407. Northwest Airlines, 808 F.2d at 77-80; DeltaAir Lines, 861 F.2d at 669; Iowa Elec. Light
& Power, 834 F.2d at 1425, 1427; Stead Motors, 843 F.2d at 357; UnitedStates PostalServ., 839
F.2d at 146, 149.
408. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Lines Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 808 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Delta
Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Lines Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 861 F.2d 665 (1lth Cir. 1988).
409. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987).
410. NorthwestAirlines, 808 F.2d at 78; DeltaAir Lines, 861 F.2d at 665-66.
411. The relevant union contracts contained provisions prohibiting pilots from drinking alcohol
within 24 hours of resuming duties in the cockpit. In Northwest Airlines the grievant admitted to
drinking during a 30 hour stopover between flights. Northwest Airlines, 808 F.2d at 78. The pilot
in DeltaAirlines had been observed drinking the evening before taking a morning flight and was
described as "glassy eyed" and "disoriented" at the time of the flight. Delta Airlines, 861 F.2d at
667.
412. Northwest Airlines, 808 F.2d at 78; Delta Air Lines, 861 F.2d at 667.
413. Northwest Airlines, 808 F.2d at 78.
414. kd. at 77-78. He had asked to be replaced prior to taking the scheduled flight. Id. at 78.
415. Id. at 78. One requirement was proof of total abstinence for two years. Id.
416. Id. The pilot enrolled in the program immediately after his discharge. Id.
417. Id. at 80. The district court held that the remedy impinged on Northwest's duty to ensure
air safety. Id.
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reversed, holding that the lower court had no valid basis for setting aside

an award which drew its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement.413

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reached
a different result in the second airline case, Delta Air Lines.4 19 In
contrast to Northwest Airlines, the Delta pilot was a pilot-in-command

rather than a co-pilot and he flew the aircraft over the entire trip

20

Upon finding no just cause for the discharge, the board of arbitration

ordered reinstatement and required that the pilot be offered an opportunity to rehabilitate himself, with the costs borne by the airline4 2t The
district court overturned the award 4 and the appellate court

agreed. 4
While upholding the portion of the award requiring the
airline to pay for the pilot's rehabilitation, the court held that the board's
decision violated clearly established public policy and could not be
enforced 24
Shortly after the Misco decision was issued, public policy toward
public safety was also addressed in Iowa ElectricLight & Power Co. v.
Local 204, IBEW.4 5 The company appealed an arbitrator's award
ordering reinstatement of a nuclear power plant machinist who had been
discharged for violating federally-mandated safety regulations 2 6 In

order to get to the lunchroom expeditiously, the employee, who had a
cast on his leg, defied the control room engineer and circumvented the
plant's interlock system by opening a secured door.427

418. Id. at 82, 84. The court also indicated that the district court's decision was not consistent
with the decision of the D.C. Circuit in U.S. Postal Service. Id. at 83.
419. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 861 F.2d 665 (11th Cir. 1988).
420. Id. at 666-67.
421. d. at 668.
422. Id. at 669-70.
423. Id. at 671.
424. Id. at 674. The court found that "[t]he existence ofpublic policy denouncing the operation
of any aircraft... while intoxicated is 'explicit,' 'well-defined, and dominant,' and 'ascertained by
reference to legal precedents."' Id. at 674. The specific public policies concerned state and federal
laws that prohibit flying while intoxicated. Id. at 673. In a similar manner, in Gulf Coast Indus.
workers Union v. Exxon Co., 991 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1993), the court sustained the decision of the
lower court that had overturned an arbitration award reinstating an employee who tested positive for
cocaine. Id. at 246. The Fifth Circuit held that the reinstatement violated public policy and that the
arbitrator should not have relied on the employee's post-discharge behavior. Id.
425. 834 F.2d 1424 (8th Cir. 1987). The Eighth Circuit took pains to identify the "strict
regulatory scheme devised by Congress for the protection ofthe public from the hazards of nuclear
radiation." Id. at 1428; see Parkersupra note 243, at 683.
426. Iowa Electric, 834 F.2d at 1426. The problem concerned the spread of radiation. The
discharge was approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Agency. Id.
427. Id.
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The arbitration turned on the issue of just cause.42 8 The arbitrator
found that the employee's act was "deliberate, improper, foolish, and
thoughtless, 4 29 but he concluded that termination was "too severe.4 30 On appeal, the district court concluded that the employee had
knowingly and willfully violated a well-defined public policy pertaining
to safety in nuclear generating plants, and it vacated the award on those
grounds. 431 On appeal by the union, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that public policy precluded
enforcement of the arbitrator's award.4 32 Citing W. R. Grace, the court
stated that if a bargaining agreement, as interpreted by the arbitrator,
violates some explicit public policy, the court must not enforce the
award.433 Once the public policy issue is raised, the court must take
the facts as found by the arbitrator but, it must review the conclusions on
a de novo basis4 34 Specifically rejecting the minimalist position set
forth earlier in this article,43' the court also held that it is "not required
to find that the award itself is illegar' before overturning the arbitrator's
decision on public policy grounds.43 6
Stead Motors v. Automotive Machinists' Lodge No. 1173"1 also
addressed public safety.4 38 One of the company's auto mechanics had
been given a written warning for improperly tightening lug bolts while
installing a wheel.43 9 A year later, he was discharged after a customer
complaint led management to discover loose and missing lug bolts on
some of the wheels he had replaced.'
The union filed a grievance on
behalf of the employee that resulted in arbitration.
The arbitrator
found that the employee had been reckless, but he reduced the penalty

428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. See id.at 1425, 1429.
432. Id. at 1429. The court concluded that "there is a well defined and dominant national policy
requiring strict adherence to nuclear safety rules:' Id. at 1427.
433. Id (citing W.R Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Int'l Union of Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757,
766 (1983)).
434. Iowa Electric, 834 F.2d at 1427 (citing E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Grasselli
Employees Indep. Ass'n, 790 F.2d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 1986)).
435. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
436. Iowa Electric, 834 F.2d at 1427 n.3.
437. 843 F.2d 357 (9th Cir. 1988), reh'g en bane, 886 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1989).
438. SteadMotors, 843 F.2d at 357.
439. Id.
440. Id. at 358.
441. Id.
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to a 120-day suspension because he felt that discharge was too severe. 44z The employer moved to vacate the award, and the district
court voided the reinstatement on the grounds that it was against public
policy."3 On appeal, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit sustained the district court's ruling.4 However, on
rehearing, the court held that the award did not violate explicit, welldefined,5and dominant California public policy and, therefore, upheld the
award."
A criminal act was the focus of United States Postal Service v.
National Association of Letter Carriers."t An arbitrator reinstated a
postal worker who had fired gunshots at his Postmaster's empty parked
The arbitrator weighed the single offense against the
car.4 7
employee's entire record and determined that the bargaining agreement
required a lesser penalty."8 On appeal, the district court reasoned that
the arbitrator's award contravened an indisputable public policy against9
permitting an employee to direct physical violence at a superior."
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed, citing the Misco standard of review.45 It concluded that the
district court had exceeded the scope of its reviewing authority.4!
"Because the parties have contracted to have disputes settled by an
arbitrator.., it is the arbitrator's view of the facts and the meaning of
the contract that they have agreed to accept.' t 452

442. Id.
443. Ka The district court order did not contain any analysis of the arbitrator's award, nor a
discussion of the legal standard applied, and it did not specify the particular public policy that was
violated by the employee's reinstatement. Stead Motors v. Automotive Machinists' Lodge No. 1173,
886 F.2d 1200, 1204 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989).
444. Stead Motors, 843 F.2d at 359. Commenting on the original Circuit Court decision,
William B. Gould has argued that this was one of several cases that "clearly put the circuit courts
on the side of... establishing broad judicial review of arbitration awards.' William B. Gould, IV,
JudicialReview of Labor Arbitration Awards - Thirty Years of the Steelworkers Trilogy: The
Afiermath ofA.T.& T and Misco, 64 NoPm DAME L. REV. 464,488 (1989).
445. See Stead Motors, 886 F.2d at 1217.
446. 839 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1988).
447. Id. at 147.
448. Id. The arbitrator considered the worker's 13 years ofservice, his prior law-abiding history,
his frustration over being repeatedly passed over for promotion, and the "supercharged emotional
atmosphere." Id.
449. United States Postal Serv. v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 663 F. Supp. 118, 119-20
(W.D. Pa. 1987).
450. United States PostalServ., 839 F.2d at 150.
451. Id. at 149.
452. Id. at 150. The court also dismissed the idea that the public sector nature of the Postal
Service created a basis for enlarging the reviewing authority of the court. Id.
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G. The Expansionist Paradigm in the Circuit Courts:
Sexual Harassment
Although Title VII of the Civil Rights Act does not explicitly
identify sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination, a number of
courts have held that sexual harassment is a form of discrimination
45 3
protected under the Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") laws.
The issue has presented itself in the national consciousness in the wake
of the charges that Professor Anita Hill voiced at the Clarence Thomas
Supreme Court confirmation hearings.!'
However, once again the
courts offer conflicting guidance, as is illustrated by the following three
cases.
Newsday, Inc. v. Long Island Typographical Union455 involved an
employer's attempt to vacate an arbitration award that ordered the
reinstatement of an employee who was discharged for sexually harassing
female co-workers.456 The employer sought vacatur on three grounds:
"the award offended the well-defined public policy against sexual
harassment in the work place; it exceeded the limits of the arbitrator's
authority; and it failed to draw its essence from the... collective
bargaining agreement."457
The district court granted Newsday's
motion.4 58 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit concluded that the district court had "properly vacated the
award as violating the explicit, well-defined, and dominant public policy
against sexual harassment in the work place."' 59
Unwanted physical contact was at the root of ChryslerMotors Corp.
v. International Union, Allied Industrial Workers."" A male fork lift

453. See, eg., Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,73 (1986); Bohen v. City of
East Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1986) (equal protection clause claim); Bundy v. Jackson, 641
F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Title VII claim).
454. See Donald J. Peterson & Douglas P. Massengill, Sexual HarassmentCases Five Years
After Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 18 EMPLOYEE RELATIONS Li. 489 (1992). A national study
of over 13,000 workers found that 42% of the women and 14% of the men had experienced some

form of sexual harassment in a three year period, although only 5% chose to report it. Id. at 489.
455. 915 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1990), cert denied, 499 U.S. 922 (1991).
456. Id. at 841. The discharged male employee had engaged in "offensive and unauthorized
contact" with several female employees. Id. at 842.

457. Id. at 841.
458. Id.
459. Id.

460. 959 F.2d 685 (7th Cir. 1992). Chrysler also presented evidence that the employee "had
committed four other incidents in which he intentionally grabbed and/orpinched female co-workers."
Id. at 686.
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truck operator was discharged by Chrysler after he sexually assaulted a
female co-worker.4 6' The union filed a grievance which Chrysler
denied and the matter proceeded to arbitration.4 62 The arbitrator
rejected evidence acquired after the employee's discharge, which
suggested that he had harassed females in the past,4 63 and determined
that the evidence did not indicate that the grievant was beyond rehabilitation.!"
Instead of discharge, the arbitrator concluded that severe
discipline would be adequate to deter the employee from future
misbehavior and that it would also demonstrate the company's opposition
to sexual harassment.4 6 On this basis, the arbitrator determined that
the worker was not discharged for "good cause," reduced the penalty to
suspension of thirty days, and directed Chrysler to reinstate the worker
with back pay.4
Both the employer and the union sought summary judgment in the
district court, where the award was affirmed and enforced.4 67 On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit also
affirmed, holding that the arbitrator's decision was within the purview of
the bargaining agreement and public policy. 6s While recognizing the
policy against sexual harassment in the work place, the Court cited Misco
for the proposition that "where it is contemplated that the arbitrator will
determine remedies for contract violations.., courts have no authority
to disagree with his honest judgment in that respect."4 9
However, in Stroehmann Bakeries v. InternationalBrotherhood of
Teansters,'47 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
favored public policy over an arbitration award. 47' The bakery discharged a worker for "immoral conduct" after a customer alleged that the
worker engaged in sexual harassment.4
The case progressed to

461. Id.at686. He allegedly approached her from the rear, grabbed her breasts, and announced,
"Yup they're real." l. at 686 n.1.
462. Id. at 686.
463. Id.

464. Id.
465. Id.
466. Id.
467. Id. at 686-87. The company sought to set the arbitration award aside and the union sought
back pay for the employee and attorney's fees. Id.
468. Id. at 689.
469. Id. at 688 (quoting Misco, 484 U.S. at 38).
470. 969 F.2d 1436 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct 660 (1992).
471. See id. at 1446.
472. rd. at 1438. The employee was accused of touching the breast of a female employee
working at a store where Stroehmann's employee delivered bread. He also was accused ofpushing
himself against her and making sexually explicit remarks that were offensive to her. Id.
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arbitration, where the arbitrator reinstated the worker with back pay.473

The employer challenged the reinstatement at the district court level. 474
The court concluded that the arbitrator's award violated public policy
against sexual harassment.45 It vacated the award and remanded the
matter to a different arbitrator.476 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit affirmed this ruling, 77 holding that an arbitrator's
award reinstating an employee accused of sexual harassment, without a
determination regarding the merits of the allegation, violates well-

established and dominant public policies.47

H. The Expansionist Paradigm and the Courts
In its 1974 Gardner-Denverdecision, the Supreme Court staked out
an expansionist position in matters where arbitrators are called upon to
deal with public policy.479

Perhaps because this decision created

doubts about the finality of arbitration, in later years the Supreme Court

made it clear that the public policy exception was to be narrow.480 The

Court did not intend to provide a hunting license on arbitration
awards.481

However, the cases discussed in this part of the article indicate that
the circuit courts of appeal often appear reluctant to accept the guidelines
offered by the Supreme Court. Their decisions are often inconsistent
with one another, as is illustrated by the conflicting approaches that
different appellate courts have taken to alcoholic airline pilots4 and
473. Id. at 1440. The arbitrator based his decision on procedural grounds because the employer
had not sufficiently investigated the incident. Id.
474. Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776, International Bhd. of Teamsters, 762 F. Supp. 1187
(M.D. Pa. 1991).
475. Id. at 1189.
476. Id. at 1190.
477. Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc., 969 F.2d at 1446-47.
478. Id. at 1444; see also New York City Transit Auth. v. Transport Workers Local 100, 606
N.Y.S.2d 510, 513 (Sup. Ct. 1993) (citing Stroehmann for the proposition that the arbitrator can
reduce the penalty of discharge and still follow federal public policy).
479. See supra, notes 300-22 and accompanying text; see generally Alexander v. GardnerDenver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
480. See W. R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Int'l Union of Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757,766
(1983); United Paper Workers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43 (1987); see also supra
notes 300-22 and accompanying text.
481. Gary S. Green & James K. Lobsenz, Grievance Resolution and the System Board of
Adjustment: The Labor Organization'sPerspective,C941 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 271, 291 (1994).
482. See Northwest Airlines v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 808 F.2d 76 (D.C Cir. 1987) (upholding
arbitration decision, thus reinstating the pilot). But see Delta Air Lines. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n,
861 F.2d 665 (11th Cir. 1988) (denying enforcement of arbitration decision reinstating pilot). .,
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sexual harassment.48

In addition, their interpretation of the public

policy exception generally seems to be broader than that of the Supreme
Court. The classic case in this area is the first decision in Stead

Motor

"

in which a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Ninth Circuit turned a garden variety discharge case into a matter of
public policy before being corrected through an en banc decision of the

court.48 5
VI.

THE NEW PARADIGM: UNBOUNDED MINMALISM

As we have seen throughout the discussion of the Gardner-Denver

line of cases,486 the federal courts made it abundantly clear that they
would not permit the decision of a labor arbitrator operating under a
collective bargaining agreement to bar an individual's statutory claim.
Then in Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp., 87 a case involving
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 488 the Supreme
Court limited the trend by ordering the arbitration of the statutory
claim4 8 9 Gilmer seems to have replaced the expansionary tendencies
triggered by Gardner-Denver with a broad policy of deferral to
arbitration, reminiscent of the Collyer doctrine adopted by the NLRB in

1971.490
There are three important distinctions between Gilmer and the other
public policy cases that have been discussed. First, Gilmer does not
involve a unionized employee working under a collective bargaining
agreement. Robert Gilmer was a highly compensated, well educated
manager of a branch of a brokerage firm." The Gilmer case, thus,

falls into the category of non-union employment arbitration rather than

483. See Newsday, Inc. v. Long Island Typographical Union, 915 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1990)
(setting aside the arbitration award dismissing the employee found to have sexually harassed his coworker). But see Chrysler Motors Corp.v. International Union Allied Industrial Workers, 959 F.2d
6S5 (7th Cir. 1992) (affirmning enforcement of arbitration decision reinstating employee found to
have sexually assaulted a female co-worker).
484. Stead Motors v. Lodge No. 1173, 843 F.2d 357, 358 (9th Cir. 1988) reh'g en bane, 886
F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1989).
485. Stead Motors, 843 F.2d at 358.
486. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight
Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981); McDonald v. City of 'West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
487. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
488. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
489. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26-27.
490. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
491. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
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labor arbitration3 92 Second, the Gilmer case does not involve an
employment contract. In order to qualify for employment, Mr. Gilmer
was required to register with various stock exchanges. 9 3 One of the
registrations that he signed required him to arbitrate any dispute under
the rules of the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"). 94 These rules,
in turn, compelled arbitration of "any controversy... arising out of the
employment or termination of employment of such registered representative. ,, 95
Finally, this case was decided pursuant to the Federal Arbitration
Act ("FAA").496 This 1925 law applies to arbitration agreements in
maritime transactions and commerce.4 97 The statute excludes contracts

of employment of "seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 498 Because the
case centered on Mr. Gilmer's NYSE registration agreement, the Court
concluded that this Section One exclusion did not apply,499 even though
the case involved the ADEA."'
The facts revealed that after six years of service as a senior vice
president with a Charlotte-based brokerage firm, Mr. Gilmer was
dismissed from his position in 1987, at age sixty-two."' He filed suit
in the district court under the ADEA. °2 He later said that he avoided
arbitration because he did not think that he would be treated fairly in that

492. The reasoning in Gilmer is distinguishable from the public policy cases previously
discussed because it deals with a discrete set of facts regarding non-union employment arbitration
rather than union labor arbitration.
493. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.

494. Id.
495. Id.
496. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
497. Id. § 2.

498. Id. § 1.
499. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2. The federal courts have remained divided on the kinds of
employees excluded and Gilmer did not clarify the matter. The dispute over the interpretation of
the exclusionary clause is at least four decades old. See, e.g., Tenney Engineering v. United Elec.,
Radio, & Machine Workers, 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953); United Elec., Radio & Machine Workers
v. Miller Metal Products, 215 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1954). See Early Years, supra note 5, at 416
(discussing the divided circuit court decisions regarding the exclusion of collective bargaining

agreements).
500. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35. This question was raised in several of the amicus briefs but the
Court saw no need to resolve that question because the agreement to arbitrate was contained in the
registration agreement rather than an employment contract. IaL at 25 n.2.
501. Id. at 23; Martha S. Weisel, After the GilmerDecision:Effectiveness ofArbitration Clauses

in Employment Contracts, 47 ARE. J. 19, 20 (1992).
502. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
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forum."0 3 His employer moved to compel arbitration because of the
agreement in the registration application."'
The district court denied this motion and based its decision on the
Gardner-Denvercase. 055 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit reversed the ruling.505 Then, in a 7-2 vote, the Supreme
Court held that statutory claims under the ADEA may be subject to the
arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the FAA.50 7 Since
neither the text nor the legislative history of the ADEA explicitly
precluded arbitration,5 °8 the Court determined that Gilmer was bound
by his agreement to arbitrate unless he could show an inherent conflict
between arbitration and the ADEA's underlying purposes." 9 The
Court decided that the NYSE arbitration procedures were sufficient to
protect Mr. Gilmer's rights. t0 Contrary to the reasoning in GardnerDenver, the Court held that the goals and the social policies of the
ADEA could be achieved through private suits, EEOC actions, or
arbitration t! In a strongly-worded footnote, the Court expressly
disavowed the mistrust of arbitration that it expressed in GardnerDenver. "That 'mistrust of the arbitral process,' however, has been

503. Peter T. Kilborn, Age Bias Case CouldLimitRight to Sue, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 25, 1991, at
Al, A1S. Mr. Gilmer said that the arbitration panels were composed of industry members and that
he believed that they were biased in favor of industry employers. Id. Gilmer's statement about the
composition of the panel was not entirely correct. Under the rules ofthe NYSE, a provision is made
for both industry and non-industry arbitrators. 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2607, at 4314 (Rule 607)
(1991). The NYSE screens, compiles, and supplies the list of arbitrators to prospective clients. Id.
at 2608. In cases involving claims that exceed S10,000, the Director of Arbitration is empowered
to appoint an arbitration panel with no less than three arbitrators. Id. at 2607. At least a majority
shall not be from the securities industry. Id. The industry is defined to include people currently
associated with members, brokers, dealers, government securities brokers or dealers, municipal
securities dealers, or registered investment advisors; people who have occupied such positions in
the past five years or who have retired from such positions in the past ten years; attorneys,
accountants, or other professionals who devoted 20% or more of their work to securities clients in
the last two years; or people who are registered under the Commodity Exchange Act or a registered
futures association. Id. The Director of Arbitration informs the parties of the names and
employment histories of the arbitrators for the past ten years. Id. at 2608. Each party may request
further information on the background of the arbitrators and it may issue one peremptory challenge
and unlimited challenges for cause. Id. at 2609.
504. Kilbom, supra note 503, at AI5.
505. See Gilmer, 500 U.S at 24.
506. Id.
507. Id. at 26.
508. Id.
509. Id.
510. See id. at 30-31.
511. Id. at 27.
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undermined by our recent arbitration decisions."512 The Court added
that "'we are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the
of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resoludevelopment
513
tion.'2

The Court dismissed any reliance on the Gardner-Denverline of
cases for three reasons. First, those cases decided whether the arbitration
of claims that were based upon a collective bargaining agreement
precluded the resolution of statutory claims by the courts.514 In Gilmer,
the plaintiff had voluntarily signed an individual agreement to arbitrate
his statutory claim and the focus was on whether such an agreement
could be enforced515 Second, sometimes unions will sacrifice an
individual's claim in order to protect the interests of the entire bargaining
unit. 16 This tension between a union's obligations to its membership
5 17
and its obligations to the individual did not exist in the Gilmer case.
Finally, there was a difference in the statutory underpinnings: the
Gardner-Denverline was decided under the NLRA, while Gilmer was
decided under the FAA.518
A. The Impact of Gilmer
Since 1991, the Gilmer case has provided a new paradigm depicting
the relationship between arbitration and the federal courts. Under this
model, the courts simply ignore the Gardner-Denverline of cases and
order arbitration.519 Between 1991 and 1994, the Gilmer case was
cited seventy-eight times. 2 The overwhelming majority of the cases
were lodged in the federal district courts as attempts to avoid arbitration
5 21
and the defendants prevailed more than seventy percent of the time.
Through these cases, the waiver of judicial remedies in favor of

512. Id. (quoting Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 231-32 (1987)).

513. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 34 n.5 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473
U.S. 614, 626-27 (1985)).
514. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 34-35.

515. Id. at 33.
516. Id. at 34-35.
517. Id. at 35.
518. Id.
519. John A. Gray, Have the Foxes Become the Guardiansof the Chickens? The Post-Gilmer
Legal Status ofPredisputeMandatoryArbitrationas a Condition ofEmployment, 37 VILL. L. REV.,
113, 119-20 (1992).

520. Calvin IV. Sharpe, Gilmer Unfolds, THE CHRON., Sept. 1994, at 6.
521. Id.
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arbitration has been extended to the Civil Rights Act of 1991,:'2 the
Fair Labor Standards Actms

the Americans with Disabilities Act

("ADA"), 24 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,5 ERISA, 26
RICO,527 the Employee Polygraph Protection Act2 8 and pendent
state claims. 529 More than half of the cases re outside the securities

industry and roughly one-quarter involved employment agreements. 530
These cases have forced the lower courts to interpret the

exclusionary aspects of Section One of the FAA. Ninety-two percent of
the time, they interpreted the employment contract exclusions narrowly.53' In essence they said that only workers in the transportation
industry were excluded from the coverage of the FAA, thereby requiring
arbitration of the vast majority of employee claims 32 What has
developed is a new form of minimalism - one that has been extensively
applied but its limits undefined.

minimalism."533

We call this "unbounded

522. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1988 (Supp. V. 1994); see, e.g., Pitter v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., No.
CV 94-1144 (RR), 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17531, at *27-28 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 1995) (noting that
"[a)ny doubt as to Congress's willingness to allow arbitration to address statutory discrimination
claims was put to rest by §118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991," which states "[w]here appropriate
and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution including ...

arbitration, is encouraged ... :) (citations omitted).

523. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988 & Supp. V 1994); see, eg., O'Connell v. Hove, 22 F.3d 463
(2d Cir. 1994) (where the court held that grievance procedures in collective bargaining agreements
shall be "exclusive procedures' for resolving grievances which fall within their coverage,
notwithstanding §16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, which confers jurisdiction on state and
federal courts to settle such disputes).
524. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102-12213 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
525. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1994); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir.
1991); Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1992); Williams v. Katten,
Muchin & Zavis, 837 F. Supp 1430 (N.D. Ill. 1993). See also Robert A. Shearer, The Impact of
Employment Arbitration Agreements on Sex Discrimination Claims: The Trend TowardNonjudicial
Resolution, 18 ENPLOYaF- REL. Li. 479 (1992).
526. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. V 1994); see, eg., United Paperworkers v.
International Paper Co., 777 F. Supp. 1010 (D. Me. 1991) (holding that an employee must ordinarily
exhaust administrative remedies under the collective bargaining agreement before instituting a civil
action against the employer).
527. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (a) - (d) (1988 & Supp. V 1994); see, eg., Haviland v. Goldman Sachs,
947 F.2d 601 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that the New York Stock Exchange Rules requiring arbitration
between members and non-members do not apply to "exchange insiders").
528. 29 U.S.C. §2001 (1988); see, eg., Saari v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 968 F.2d
877 (9th Cir. 1992).
529. See, eg., Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991).
530. See Sharpe, supra note 520, at 6.
531. See Sharpe, supra note 520, at 6-7.
532. See Sharpe, supra note 520, at 7-8.
533. The term "unbounded minimalismf' has been developed for this article.
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VII. ANALYSIS, PART I: MINIMALIST AND EXPANSIONIST
PARADIGMS
The case law leads to two conclusions. First, the policies adopted
by the federal courts toward the arbitration of disputes that involve
employees have changed greatly over time. This has been amply
demonstrated by the swings between the minimalist and expansionist
paradigms reported throughout this article. The second conclusion
pertains to matters of public policy. Today we have divergent, contradictory policies. One set applies to employees covered by collective
bargaining agreements and the other set, to the rest of the work-force.
For example, the courts willingly accept sexual harassment cases when
submitted by employees covered by arbitration provisions in a collective
bargaining agreement, 534 while dismissing the harassment cases filed
by non-union employees who have signed individual agreements to
arbitrate disputes in the employment relationship. 35 We will examine
the divergence in policies in the following section.
A. The Minimalist Paradigm
According to the minimalist paradigm, the courts should enforce an
arbitration award without looking into its merits as long as the arbitrator
remains within the limits of contractual authority the award arguably
construes the contract, and it does not command an act which violates a
statute or a clearly-defined precedent.536 The Supreme Court adopted
this model in the Trilogy and, while it moved away from it in Gardner
537
Denver, that model returned to influence W R. Grace and Misco.

534. See Shearer, supra note 525, at 479.

535. Weisel, supra note 501, at 20. In Hirras v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 10 F.3d 1142
(5th Cir. 1994), the plaintiff was a railroad ticket taker who sued her employer for intentional
infliction of emotional distress because of the employer's unresponsiveness to her complaints about
a work environment oppressive to women. Id. at 1145. The district court found that her suit was

arbitrable and dismissed it. Id. at 1149. A unanimous panel for the Fifth Circuit, citing Gilmer,
agreed. Id. This case was heard under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1988). The
arbitration provisions of the Act, also preempted her claim. Hirras, 10 F.3d at 1145.
536. The definitions of the minimalist paradigm, the expansionist paradigm and unbounded
minimalism all assume that the process itself satisfies common statutory requirements- thatinler
alia, there was an absence offraud and corruption, there was arbitral disclosure ofpotential conflicts
of interest, that the hearing was procedurally correct, and that the decision was without bias.

537. InMisco, however, the Court specifically refused to address the minimalist position. Misco,
484 U.S. at 45 n.12 (1987).
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The principal justifications of the minimalist paradigm are preventing
excessive judicial interference in collective bargaining; providing to the
parties that for which they bargained; and preserving the elements that
made arbitration attractive - informality, speed, cost, and finality. It is
further argued that arbitrators can deal with external law adequately in
public policy cases, as they have been doing in such areas as ERISA,
bankruptcy,538 Social Security, disability cases, workers' compensation,
police and firefighter heart and lung laws, and others. 39
But the Supreme Court has not fully embraced this standard in
recent years. In Misco, the paperworkers argued that an award should
not be set aside unless it commanded an illegal act.5 40
The Court
41
specifically withheld its judgment on that position.
In addition, there
are still doubts about the ability of the arbitration process to protect the
statutory rights of individuals and the public interest, 42 and the reality
taught by the case law is that the minimalist paradigm thus far has
represented an unattainable ideal. The lower courts simply have not been
willing to 43
accept the limitations that a minimalist model places on their
5
authority.
B. The Expansionist Paradigm
Under an expansionist model, the judiciary is more willing to review
the merits of an arbitration award and more prone to set aside awards
that it finds displeasing. 5" Its proponents focus on the importance of
protecting individual rights and the public interest; inadequacies of the
arbitration forum; and arbitral excess.5 45 They argue that the principles
that justify judicial deference do not apply when public policies or the
public welfare are at stake. 6 Courts cannot abdicate their role as final

538. LABOR ARBITRATION IN AMEICA: AN ANNOTATED BmLIOGRAPHY 110, 138.40 (Charles
. Coleman & Theodora Haynes eds., 1994).
539. Joan G. Dolan, Arbitrationof Health-RelatedIssues, With Special Reference to the ADA,
47th Annual Meeting of the NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBrt'AToRs, 57 (1995).
540. Misco, 484 U.S. at 36.
541. Id. at 45.
542. See Gail Lopez-Henriquez, Arbitration and Discrimination Against Workers with
Disabilities: A Labor Perspective, 47th Annual Meeting of the NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
ARBITRATORS, 57 (1995).
543. Misco, 484 U.S. 29; see supra notes 324-66 and accompanying text.
544. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
545. PAUL R. flAYS, LABOR ARBIrRATION: A DISswmING Viv 37-75 (1966).
546. Carie Fox & Brian Gruhn, Toward A PrincipledPublicPolicy Standard: JudicialReview
ofArbirrator'sDecisions, 3 DET. C.L. REv. 863, 868-69 (1989).
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arbiter of statutory rights, for that is their area of responsibility as well
as expertise 47 And when an arbitration award endangers the interests
of individuals who were not party to the contract, there is a strong
argument for heightened judicial review 48 Furthermore, the broader
standard of review protects the parties against the arbitrator's "occasional
appetite to 49gobble up the very agreement which had granted him his
authority."5
Critics of the expansionist model have assembled a "parade of
horribles" to justify their position."' 0 They argue that this approach
would open the floodgates of judicial review and destroy the finality of

arbitration awards,"'1 but the defenders maintain that this parade has
never marched!5" The record shows that very few arbitration awards
are appealed to the courts for review and that the courts rarely set these
awards aside 5 3 After examining all of the appeals of arbitration
awards to the federal courts from 1960 to 1988, Feuille and LeRoy
concluded that far less than one percent were appealed,5 54 and theS
courts upheld the arbitration award seventy three percent of the time.
However, from our perspective, the expansionist paradigm ignores
Supreme Court decisions from the Trilogy through Misco. The Supreme
Court has made it eminently clear that it does not want the lower courts

547. See Deanna L Mouser, Analysis of the Public Policy Exception After Paperworkers v.
Misco: A Proposalto Limit the Public Policy Exception and to Allow the Partiesto Submit the
Public PolicyQuestion to the Arbitrator,12 INDUS. REL. LJ.89, 95 (1990).
548. Fox & Gruhn, supra note 546, at 864.
549. Fox & Gruhn, supranote 546, at 894 (making reference to Harry Shulman, Reason, Contract,and Law in LaborRelations, 68 HARv. L. REV. 999, 1016 (1955)).
550. Fox & Gruhn, supra note 546, at 864 & n.6.
551. See generallyJoan Parker, JudicialReview of Labor ArbitrationAwards: Misco and Its
Impact of the Public PolicyException, 4 LAB. LJ.683 (1988).
552. Fox & Gruhn, supra note 546, at 864.
553. Peter Feuille & Michael LeRoy, GrievanceArbitration Appeals in the Federal Courts:
Facts andFigures,45 ARB.3. 35,40 (1990).
554. Id. at 42. Between 1961 and 1965 six-tenths of one percent of arbitration awards were
appealed. Between 1981 and 1985 it was about eight-tenths of one percent. Id. at 42. The authors
probably overestimate the percentage appealed for two reasons. First, they only considered published
decisions. Inclusion of unpublished court decisions would reduce the percentage of appeals further.
Second, they only considered awards issued under the auspices of the American Arbitration
Association and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. Id. at 41. Data that was not
available to them at the time of their study has shown that these two agencies only administer about
40% of the arbitrations that take place in the United States. LABOR ARB'RATION INAIhtERJCA: THE
PROFESStON AND PRAC'ICE 95 (Michael F. Bognanno & Charles J.Coleman eds., 1992).
555. Feuille & LeRoy, supranote 553, at 44. The district courts confirmed the arbitration hward
in its entirety 73% of the time (698 out of962 times) and circuit courts did so 71% of the time (274
times in 388 cases). Feuille & LeRoy, supra note 553, at 44. Decisions other than confirmation or
vacaturhave been eliminated. Feuille & LeRoy, supra note 553, at 44.
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interpreting collective bargaining agreements, and that it craves a narrow
standard of review 5 The expansionist model not only conflicts with
public policies that call for arbitration as a means of settling disputes, but
it injects the courts into the collective bargaining process. It violates the
bargain that the parties made when the union relinquished its right to
strike in return for the right to take grievances to final and binding
arbitration P5 This approach also leads to double punishment in the
case of criminal law violations - employees may lose their jobs as well
as their court case. Finally, the expansionist approach limits the ability
of the arbitrator to apply mitigating factors in determining just cause and
it creates a dilemma concerning how to protect precious individual,
organizational, and societal rights without destroying the arbitration
system.
C. A Sampler of Alternative Approaches to Judicial Review
Due to the fact that so much controversy has surrounded the
minimalist and the expansionist paradigms, a number of writers have
made recommendations on the subject of judicial review of labor
arbitration awards5 58 Some propose a formula of words. Clyde W.
Summers, for example, endorses the position that "the court[s] should
vacate an award only if no arbitrator or group of arbitrators could
conceivably have made such a ruling' 559 "mhe arbitrator was chosen
to be a judge. That judge has spoken.- There it ends" 56° Focusing on
the essence standard, Thomas- G.S. Christensen argues that while the
standard is imprecise, it "clearly adjures the courts to reverse arbitral
judgment only when it poses an adjudication that the parties have
prohibited."'561

556. W. R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Int'l Union of Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 764
(1983).

557. Fox & Grubn, supra note 546, at 864 n.6.
558. Clyde V. Summers, 7he Trilogy and Its Offspring Revisited: Its a Contract, Stupid 71

VASH. U. L.Q. 1021, 1046 (1993) (Summers refers to Douglas E. Ray, Protectingthe Parties'
Bargain After Misco: Court Review of Arbitration Awards, 64 IND. LJ. 17 (1988)); see, e.g.,
Amanda 3.BerloweJudicialDeferenceto Grievance.Arbitrationin the PrivateSector: Saving Grace
in the Search for a Well Defined Public Policy Exception, 42 U. MMAUI L. REV. 767 (1988).

559. Summers, supra note 558, at 1046.
560. Safeway Stores v. American Bakery & Confectionery Workers Int'l Union Local 111,390
F.2d 79, 84 (5th Cir. 1968).
561. Thomas G.S. Christensen, JudicialReview: As ArbitratorsSee It,Proceedings of the 25th
Annual Meeting of the NATIONAL ACADE y OF AiBrrRATORS 99, 112 (1972).
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Perhaps the standard of review announced by the Supreme Court
as applicable to the determinations of arbitral review boards under the
Railway Labor Act that they are reversible only if wholly baseless and
completely without reason is too 'giant' a step to track under Section
301. A somewhat more acceptable bench mark may well be that
adopted by the Third Circuit in Ludwig Honold - that an award be
vacated only where there is a manifest disregard of the agreement,
totally unsupported by principles of contract construction and the law
of the shop. 62
Amanda . Berlowe proposes to limit the scope of judicial
review 63 She is concerned with protecting the finality of labor
arbitration awards while "vindicating clear expressions of public policy
regarding acceptable workplace behavior."5" She proposes that the
courts restrict the application of the public policy exception in employee
reinstatement disputes to those instances that are covered in statutes and
regulations "clearly directed at deterring specific forms of behavior in the
workplace."5' 6 She adds that "[s]tatutes and regulations that expressly
regulate clearly defined behaviors in the workplace are the only forms of
positive law that embody a 'well defined and dominant' expression of
public interest with regard to reinstatement disputes.'"566 The key
words are specific and workplace. For example, the criminal statutes
usually would not qualify because they lack a clear connection to the
workplace;567 nor would such general statements about the desirability
of reliability and efficiency as expressed in the Postal Reorganization
56
Act. s
John Dunsford argues that the Supreme Court adopted a broad
definition of public policy in W R. Grace.69 Because the Court

562. Id.
563. Amanda L Berlowe, JudicialDeference to GrievanceArbitration in the Private Sector:
Saving Grace in the Searchfor a Well-Defined PublicPolicy Exception, 42 U. MIAlIi L. REV. 767

(1988).
564. Id. at 798.
565. Id.

566. Id. at 799.
567. Id.
568. Id. at 801.
569. John E. Dunsford, The JudicialDoctrine ofPublic Policy: Misco Reviewed, 4 LAB. LAW.
669, 674-75 (1988). Public policy has been defined as

[C]ommunity common sense and common conscience extended and applied throughout
the state to matters of public morals, public health, public safety, public welfare, and the
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rejected the invitation to equate public policy with simple illegality, he
defines the public policy exception with a test 7 He proposes that
"the Court might announce a rule that an arbitrator's award should not
be set aside as a violation of public policy unless [it] can declare that any
agreement between a company and union embodying the same result.., would not be enforceable if sued on by either party.""7 Thus,
in Northwest Airlines, the court could only set aside the award if there
was a well defined and dominant public policy expressed in law or legal
precedent prohibiting the reemployment of pilots who are reformed
alcoholics. 572
Timothy I. Heinsz offers a methodology. He has coined a set of
"devolution principles" for cases where public policy rights and contract
issues are intertwined and the parties agree to let the arbitrator decide the
public policy issue. 3 He proposes that deference be given to an
arbitrator's award "if the parties inform and jointly submit the public
policy issue to the arbitrator in determining the contractual dispute, if the
forum of arbitration is adequate to handle the issue, and if the arbitrator
considers the issue and applies a proper legal standard."574
D. Recommendations
We believe that any solution to the problem of judicial review has
to be based upon an analysis of many factors, particularly the historical
and institutional context within which the courts and the arbitrators
operate, the participants in the process, the encompassing law, and the
arbitration decisions themselves. We contend that an analysis of these
characteristics and their relationships leads to the conclusion that labor
arbitration awards should have a high degree of immunity from judicial
review. The central questions concern the precise degree of immunity

like; [i]t is that general and well settled public opinion relating to man's plain, palpable

duty to his fellowmen, having due regard to all the circumstances of each particular
relation and situation.
BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1231 (6th ed. 1990); cited in Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety

Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 796 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
570. Dunsford, supra note 569, at 681.
571. Dunsford, supra note 569, at 681.
572. Dunsford, supra note 569, at 681-82.
573. Timothy . Heinsz, JudicialReview ofLaborArbitration Awards: The EnterpriseWheel
GoesAroundandAround,52 Mo. L. RBv. 243,295 (1987) (applying the principles to wrongful discharge actions).
574. Id.
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and how it is to be secured. 5
The Historical and Institutional Context.--The most significant
contextual considerations tie into the maturity of the field of labor
arbitration and the surrounding institution of collective bargaining. Labor
arbitration has been the dominant form of resolving disputes over
employee grievances for some sixty years. 6 In the public sector it
also plays a significant role in resolving contract disputes.577 As the
field has matured, a professional society (the National Academy of
Arbitrators) has flourished, a code of ethics has developed,5 78 programs
have become available at universities and professional institutions,579
and texts and hornbooks have appeared as has an extensive bibliography.5 0 Furthermore, the agreements that the arbitrators construe have
been evolving for several decades and provide a great deal of specific
guidance. The contract usually spells out the terms and conditions of
employment in great detail, along with the requirements of just cause,
and the boundaries of arbitral discretion.
The Participants--Theadvocates that typically appear in arbitration
have reached a high level of sophistication. The parties should know
what they are getting when they select an arbitrator because information
is available through the appointing agencies, from colleagues, from the
arbitrator's published decisions, and from tracking services. 5 l Furthermore, a method by which an arbitrator's credentials can be ascertained
may aid in the selection process. Admission to the National Academy
of Arbitrators requires demonstration of long term acceptability to a wide
variety of parties.
The arbitrators themselves are usually well-qualified, decisionmakers. The typical labor arbitrator has advanced academic degrees normally a J.D. or a Ph. D., is over fifty years of age, has more than

575. Mark Berger, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: Practices,Policies, and

Sanctions, 10 HOMRA LAB. L. 245, 278 (1992).
576. See generallyBognanno & Coleman, supra note 554, cbs. 2, 5, & 6.
577. Cf.Bognanno & Coleman, supra note 554, at 35.
578. Bognanno & Coleman, supra note 554, at 15. The NAA Ethics Committee developed a
"code of Professional Responsibility for Arbitrators of Labor Management Disputes.' Bognanno &
Coleman, supra note 554, at 15.

579. For example, Comell University's undergraduate school of International Labor Relations
offers a course in arbitration taught by Professor Jim Gross.
580. See, e.g., ROBERT M. RODMAN, COMMERCIAL ARBrIrATION WTH FORMs (1984); PETER
B. BROIDA, A GUIDE To FEDERAL LABOR RELAnoNs AUTHORITY LAW & PRACTICE (1994).
581. Sie generally Bognanno & Coleman, supra note 554, at 65-83.

582. Bognanno & Coleman, supra note 554, at 44. Admission to the NAA reqtdires
demonstration by the arbitrator-candidate of a high level of acceptability to a broad array of clients.
The minimal benchmark is 50 cases in five years. Bognanno & Coleman, supra note 554, at-44.
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twenty years of experience in labor arbitration on top of a previous
career in the labor-management arena, and has decided several hundred
cases. 5 3 Their neutrality is encouraged by the joint selection process. 58"
The EncompassingLaw--This article has shown that the law which
surrounds labor arbitration is generally clear, well-established and
comprehensive.8 The most significant remaining questions pertain to the
'"essence test"" and the finality of a labor arbitrator's award in cases
that involve public policy.
The Decisions Themselves.-One of the most compelling features
of labor arbitration is its predictability 5
Although experienced
advocates may be surprised by a single decision, they can usually predict
the outcome of most cases in advance.5 More importantly, experienced advocates understand the process and know what will happen if
they lose. They know, for example, that the proceedings will be
informal;. 8 that the arbitrator will probably give them much more
freedom than would be given in a court of law;58 9 that contractual time
limits will be rigidly enforced;5 90 that arbitrators will apply less
stringent rules of evidence than would be applied by a court;5 91 that the

burden of proof will seldom reach the criminal standard; 92 and that if
a discharge is found to be meritless, the grievant will be reinstated with
back pay (less offsets that they also understand).593
Conclusions.--The interaction of all of these variables - the
context, participants, the decision, and the law suggests that the
Supreme-Court was wise in establishing a policy of deference to the

583. Bognanno & Coleman, supranote 554, at 39,45,47,54, 68-69. The data also show that
arbitrators are overwhelmingly white and male, which leaves them vulnerable to criticism in cases
involving gender-based discrimination or harassment. Bognanno & Coleman, supra note 554, at 4448.
584. For example, in labor cases the American Arbitration Association's process calls for the
submission of nine names of arbitrators to the parties who have filed for arbitration along with
biographical sketches. If the parties cannot reach agreement from that list, they are entitled to a
second list of nine and a third list of three.
585. See supra text accompanying note 67.
586. Robert . Thornton & Perry A. Zirkel, The Consistency and Predictabilityof Grievance
ArbitrationAwards, 43 INDUS. & LAB. REL REv. 294, 302 (1990).
587. Id. at 295.
588. See FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA A. ELKOURI, How ARBiTRATION WoRKS 253 (4th ed. 1985).
589. See id.
590. See id. at 193.
591. See id. at 252-53.
592. See id. at 277-79.
593. See id. at 648.
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labor arbitration process. This analysis shows that labor arbitration is a
mature institution. The field is well defined and the law is relatively
clear. The underlying collective bargaining agreements are well
developed and comprehensive.
The parties who negotiate these
agreements have chosen arbitration as the best available way to provide
a clear and final resolution to problems that have developed under their
agreement.594 Using St. Antoine's metaphor: "[t]he arbitrator's award
is not so much an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement
as an organic extension, a fulfillment, a flowering of the seed it planted."595 We argue that as long as the award stays within the boundaries
specified by the agreement, the arbitrator has fulfilled the commission of
the parties and the award deserves the support of the courts.
And what are those boundaries?-The parties have asked the
arbitrator to dispense a form of justice that is bounded by the contract as
it is informed by the practices of the industry and the shop in consideration of relevant mitigating circumstances. 9 6 This is what they bargained for and this is what they should get. The courts should enforce
any award based upon these factors unless it (1) conflicts with express
terms of the agreement; (2) imposes additional requirements not
expressly provided in the agreement; or (3) is not rationally supported or
derived from the agreement.5 97 If these conditions are met, the award
will have remained within the boundaries. 9
Some aspect of the complex, overlapping, contradictory melange
of employment laws is sure to enter into many arbitrations. Sometimes
it is impossible to ignore external law because the parties ask the
arbitrator to rule on it, the contract tracks it, or a potential violation is at
the core of the case. The arbitrator is often faced with the dilemma of
ignoring the law and facing reversal for doing so or basing the decision
upon the law and, similarly, facing reversal for doing so.",
However, the arbitrator's job is the interpretation of the labor

594. See generally Harry Shulman, Reason, Contract,and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV.
L. REV. 999 (1955).
595. Theodore J. St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at

Enterprise Wheel and its Progeny, Proceedings of the 30th Annual Meeting of the NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 29, 32 (1977).

596. See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960).
597. Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. United Automobile Workers Local 878,981 F.2d 261,268 (6th
Cir. 1992).
598. See id.
599. A.C. Knowlton, Address on sexual harassment at the Education Meetings of the NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF ARBrRATORS, in Boston (Fall 1994) [hereinafter Knowlton].
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agreement: "It's a contract, stupid," ' and the arbitrator's task is to
interpret it.601 Arbitrators are not to determine whether a grievant's
statutory rights have been violated. They cannot ignore the law, but they
must ultimately determine whether there is just cause under the contract
to take action against the grievant. 6 2 If a grievant claims that her
discharge resulted from gender discrimination, for example, her first
entitlement is to a decision made on the basis of the words of the
contract, the practices in the industry and the shop, and the consideration
of mitigating circumstances.6 3 The grievant is also entitled to a
process which we think should be drawn from the deferral policies of the
NLRB. These policies begin with the assumption, now ratified in
Gilmer, that the arbitration forum provides an adequate basis for the
resolution of statutory issues.6° The core requirements for deferral to
arbitration when statutory rights are involved would be as follows:
(1) That there be fair and regular proceedings. Determination of
a fair and regular proceeding would focus on the selection process and
the hearing. The key questions in the selection process are whether the
parties were presented with a choice among people with the characteristics of neutrality and whether they were given sufficient information
about the potential arbitrators.05 Questions about the fairness of the
hearing would usually be answered in the arbitrator's award.
(2) That there be presentation of facts. The facts relating to the
public policy issue must be presented to60 the
arbitrator and the issue
6
considered and decided by the arbitrator.
(3) That the arbitrator's decision be consistent with public policy.
The final test is whether the award is repugnant to the policy. An
arbitrator's decision should receive deference unless it is susceptible to
an interpretation inconsistent with the policy that lies at the crux of the
case."' The opinion, frthermore, should detail the relationship
between the contractual and the policy issues to show that they are

600. Summers, supra note 558, at 1042.
601. Summers, supra note 558, at 1041-42.
602. Knowlton, supra note 599, at 1.

603. See Summers, supra note 558, at 1049.
604. See supra notes 487-533 and accompanying text.
605. See ELKoUmX & ELKOuRI, supra note 588, at 87-89. In employment arbitration cases,
another question would be "who made the selection decision?" In the case of the NYSE, while the
participants have the right to challenge candidates for arbitration, the Director of Arbitration makes
the decision. 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2608, at 4315 (Rule 608) (1991).
606. See Gould, supra note 444, at 490-91.
607. See Gould, supra note 444, at 489.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1995

65

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 1
Hofstra Labor Law Journal
[Vol. 13:1

parallel and that the award does not undermine public policy."'
(4) The arbitrator's role as finder of fact or as an expert on the
contract and the law of the shop should not be challenged. The
questions that the court should address should be restricted to the public
policy. If the court concludes that the arbitrator has not adequately
considered the public policy issue, perhaps the remedy should be to
remand
the case to the arbitrator for further consideration of this
69
issue. 0

VIII. ANALYSIS, PART II: UNBOUNDED MINIMALISM
The Gilmer decision may have resulted from a pragmatic desire to
control the burgeoning dockets of the U.S. courts. When Gilmer was
decided in 1991 there were 33,428 civil cases pending in the U.S. Court
610
of Appeals and 226,439 cases pending in the U.S. district courts.
The rise in the number of employment discrimination suits has been
particularly severe. The number of discrimination cases increased by
2,166% between 1970 and 1989 as compared to 125% for all other
litigation.1 Whatever the basis for the decision, however, Gilmer has
been embraced by the lower courts and there is a strong possibility that
it may have ended the influence of the Gardner-Denverline of cases.
Many, however, are opposed to the decision, particularly attorneys
who represent the plaintiffs in employment disputes. 612 The outcry
from the plaintiff's bar has led to class action suits filed against the
American Arbitration Association (for unfairly weighting its arbitration
panels in favor of employers)
and to movements for legislation in both
613
houses of Congress.
Civil Rights lawyers say that companies that require binding arbitration
for discrimination complaints are thwarting the will of Congress, which

608. See Gould, supra note 444, at 492. Among other things these recommendations were built
around the proviso in the Gardner-Denverdecision which said:
[w]here an arbitral determination gives full consideration to an employee's Title VII
rights, a court may properly accord it great weight. This is especially true where the
issue is solely one of fact, specifically addressed by the parties and decided by the
arbitrator on the basis of an adequate record.
Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 60 n.21.
609. See Gould, supra note 444, at 491-92.
610. 1992 DrncroR OF THE ADMiN. OF THE U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 130.
611. 1991-1992 AM. ARB. Ass'N. GEN. CouNs. ANN. REP. 127 (1992).
612. Telephone Interview with Cliff Palevski, of McGuinn, Hillsman, & Palevskd, who is
associated with the National Employment Lawyers Association in San Francisco (Aug.- 1995).
613. Olson v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 876 F. Supp 850 (N.D. Tex. 1995).
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in 1991 voted to allow jury trials and larger damage awards in cases
involving bias on the basis of sex, religion or disability. Before the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, cases were heard by Federal
judges, and awards were limited to back pay and lawyer fees. t 4
However, the Gilmer decision probably represents the leading edge
of a broader movement to promote non-judicial dispute settlement. The
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990615 permits agencies to
use dispute resolution procedures if the parties agree 16 The Civil
Rights Act of 1991617 and the Americans With Disabilities Act
(1990)618 also encourage Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR").
Encouraged by its backlog of almost 100,000 complaints,6 19 the EEOC
has sponsored pilot programs in Houston, Philadelphia, New Orleans, and
Washington.620 The Department of Labor has a regional ADR approach in place for civil and criminal cases and New York State
amended its Human Rights Law in 1991 to permit voluntary arbitration
of complaints. 62 ' By 1994, such large corporations as I.T.T., Hughes,
Rockwell International, National Case Register, Blue Cross/Blue Shield
of Michigan, Brown and Root, and Travelers had adopted policies
requiring the arbitration of discrimination claims. 6' Other companies
such as General Mills, M.C.I., and Conoco were considering putting
similar policies into effect. 62 In the face of these developments, is the
field of employment arbitration ready for this expansion? Using the
analytical scheme introduced above, certain topics must be considered.
The Historicaland Institutional Context.-While labor arbitration
has a well documented history and there is voluminous literature on the
topic, the arbitration of other employment disputes has not been a
significant part of the practice of labor arbitration624 and the literature
614. Steven A. Holmes, Some Employees Lose Right to Suefor Bias at Work, N.Y. Tis,
18, 1994, at Al.
615. 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-83 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
616. Id. § 572(a).
617. 42 U.S.C. § 1981-1988 (Supp. V 1994).

Mar.

618. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V 1994).

619. Peter T. Kilborn, Backlog of Cases is Overwhelming Job-Bias Agency, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
26, 1994, at Al, A10.

620. Hillary Durgin, LaborMediation ProjectEases Agency's Load, HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 27,
1994, at 1.
621. Walter L Gershenfeld, New Roles ForLaborArbitrators:WillArbitrators' Work ReallyBe
Different?, 47th Annual Meeting of the NAMONAL ACADUY OF ARBITRATORS 275, 279 (1994).
622. Holmes, supra note 614, at Al.
623. Holmes, supra note 614, at Al.

624. Bognanno & Coleman, supra note 554, at 92. Non-union arbitration cases amounted to
roughly two and one halfpercent of the cases handled by U.S. arbitrators in 1986. Bognanno &
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is comparatively slim.6 2s When the Supreme Court decided Gilmer, it
was dealing with an institution far less developed than labor arbitration.
The Participants.--TheGilmer decision has probably opened the

arbitration of employment disputes to a new cadre of advocates and
arbitrators. In the field of labor arbitration there is a well established
process of joint decision-making that enhances the probability that the
grievant's case will be decided by a qualified arbitrator.6 26 However,
the selection processes in other fields vary. Although more firms are

apparently using arbitrators from the employment panels of such
traditionally neutral sources as the American Arbitration Association or
the Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services, the NYSE, however,

establishes and maintains its own list of arbitrators. 627 A report of the
General Accounting Office was sharply critical of securities arbitration
in employment discrimination cases. 628 Particularly harsh criticism has
been leveled at the almost all male composition of the arbitration panel
in this industry.62 9
The Encompassing Law;--The Gilmer decision has raised many
63
fundamental questions that are beyond the scope of this article. D
Pragmatically, however, the decision has failed to answer a number of
the following significant operational questions.

Coleman, supra note 554, at 92.
625. Coleman & Haynes, supra note 538, at 35-227. There are 1,336 citations on arbitration
of employment issues. Only 41 of these (three percent) pertain to non-union employees and
wrongful discharge. Coleman & Haynes, supra note 538, at 35-227.
626. See Thornton & Zirkel, supra note 586, at 302.
627. See Margaret A. Jacobs, Riding Crops and Slurs: How Wall Street Dealt with a Sex-Bias
Case, VALL ST. J., June 9, 1994, at 1.
628. See Larry Horinko & Amy Hunter, U.S. GeneralAccountingOfice Report reEmployment
Discrimination:How RegisteredRepresentativesFare in DiscriminationDisputes, in SECURMES
ARBITRATION 1994, at 2-3 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Handbook Series No. B4-7072).
629. Jacobs, supra note 627, at 1.
630. A number ofseholars have asserted that there are strong arguments that the FAA was never
intended to apply to employment situations and that the Gilmerdecision does not reflect the original
intent of Congress. They argue that the original law was narrowly designed to help resolve
commercial disputes quickly, inexpensively, and equitably. They further argue that employment
issues were broadly excluded from the coverage of the Act. See generally Michael J. Gallagher,
Statutory Rights andPredisputeAgreements to Arbitratein ContractsofEmployment, 66 ST JOHN'S
L. REV. 1067 (1992); Carol-Tiegue J. Thomas, Comment, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corporation: When is an Employee's Right to a Judicial Forum Precluded by an Arbitration
Agreement, 27 NEV ENO. L. Rlv. 791 (1993); Maria C. Whittaker, Gilmer v. Interstate: Liberal
PolicyFavoringArbitrationTrammels PolicyAgainstEmployment Discrimination,56 ALB. L. REV.
273 (1992).
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A. The Collective Bargaining Question

There is no question that the reach of the FAA is extensive.63 t
Still, the FAA excludes most contracts of employment and the Gilmer
Court failed to determine the boundaries of this exclusion632 because
the arbitration clause being enforced was part of a securities registration
agreement, rather than an employment contract.633 The modem hold-

ings of the federal courts indicate that collective bargaining agreements
are contracts of employment, and therefore, are excluded from the

coverage of the FAA.634 This position was urged long ago in Justice
Frankfurter's dissent in Lincoln Mills.635 By failing to define the
boundaries of the exclusionary clause in the FAA, the Gilmer Court has

reopened this question.
Gilmer has already been extended to at least one collective

bargaining case. In Austin v. Owens-Broclaway Glass Container,
Inc.,636 the district court refused to hear a claim of discrimination under
the ADA because the claimant had not exhausted her remedies under the
contractual grievance procedure. 637 The claimant lost her job after she

had "become disabled as a result of an on-the-job injury.""63

Her

request for a light duty assignment was denied and the company claimed
that her position had been eliminated.639 When the only other

employee in that position, a male, was later offered reassignment to
another job, she filed a sex discrimination suit under Title VII of the

631. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11-13, (1984).
632. Gilmerv. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp, 500 U.S. 20 (1991). In his dissent, Justice Stevens
(joined by Justice Marshall) indicated that he was displeased with the way that the decision skirted
"the antecedent question [ofi whether the coverage of the Act even extends to arbitration clauses
contained in employment contracts" Id. at 36. He suggested that the decision conflicted with "the
Congressional purpose animating the ADEA." Id. at 41.
633. Id. at 23-24.
634. Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local 9, 739 F.2d 1159 (7th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985); American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 823
F.2d 466,473 (11th Cir. 1987); Central States Pension Fund v. TankTransp. Inc., 779 F. Supp. 947,
949 (lN.D. I11.1991); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 311 (6th Cir. 1991).
635. Lincoln Mills v. Textile Workers Union, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). Justice Frankfurter argued
unsuccessfully that the silent treatment given the FAA in Lincoln Mills implied that it was not
available for use in collective bargaining agreements and he urged that the rejection of the FAA be
made explicit. Id. at 466.
636. 844 F. Supp. 1103 (W.D. Va. 1994).
637. Id. at 1107.
638. Id. at 1104.
639. Id.
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Civil Rights Act and a disability discrimination action under ADA.6 0
Despite the fact that the plaintiff was covered by a collective bargaining
agreement, the Court cited Gilmer as evidence that ADA claims must
The post-Gilmer status of agreefirst be submitted to arbitration."
ments to arbitrate
under
collective
bargaining agreements needs
2

clarification.6
B.

Does Gilmer Effectively Terminate the Gardner-DenverLine?

Gilmer created a policy of pre-arbitration deferral - it ordered the
enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate" 3 in much the way the NLRB
orders arbitration under its Collyer doctrine. 6 " On a before-the-fact
basis, Gilmer held that arbitration can protect a person's statutory
rights.'
But, does submission to arbitration preclude an after-the-fact
review as to whether those rights have been adequately protected?
The Gardner-Denver decision called attention to the "distinctly
separate nature of these contractual and statutory rights"646 and that "no
inconsistency results from permitting both rights to be enforced in their
respectively appropriate forums." ' 7 When the Gilmer Court concluded
that the goals and the social policies of the ADEA could be achieved
through private suits, EEOC actions, or arbitration, it contradicted this
notion."8 Let us suppose that a case has been arbitrated under a
Gilmer order and the grievant is not satisfied with the result. Does the
grievant's right to court review terminate because of the Gilmer doctrine
or does that grievant retain the right to a day in court on the claim that
statutory rights. were not adequately protected in the arbitration process?
Whether Gilmer established a policy of post-arbitration deferral as well
as pre-arbitration deferral remains open.

640. Id.
641. Id. at 1107. The decision did not mention Gardner-Denveror any of the cases decided
under that line.
642. Citing Gilmer, the court denied the grievant access to statutory remedies and then denied
the grievance because the proper channel of mandatory arbitration, under the collective bargaining
agreement, was not followed and because the cause of the grievance stemmed from an event which
occurred after she had become disabled and was no longer in the employ of the company. Austin,
844 F. Supp. at 1106.
643. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27.

644. See supra notes 267-86 and accompanying text.
645. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25-35.
646. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 50 (1974).

647. Id.
648. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27-28.
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C. What About the Arbitrator's Remedial Powers?
The traditional arbitration award in a discharge case under a
collective bargaining agreement is limited to a make-whole remedy. 9
However, punitive damages can be awarded in wrongful discharge
actions raised in the courts,' in cases brought to the courts under the
9 6 1 and under the 1991 amendments to Title VII of the Civil
ADA
Rights Act.6" Is the arbitrator limited to the traditional remedy in
these cases? The Gilmer deision noted that "[a]rbitrators do have the
power to fashion equitable relief,"6 and that the rules of the NYSE
provided for "damages and/or other relief."6 " Does this mean that
arbitrators have the power to award punitive damages in Gilmer type
cases? And, if so, might they have the power to award similar damages
in public policy cases raised under collective bargaining agreements or
even among garden variety discharge cases?
IX.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

655
Section 173(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act
provides that "[f]inal adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties
is hereby declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance
disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing
collective-bargaining' agreement. 616 For almost half-a-century, the
public policy of the United States has favored arbitration as the
mechanism for settling disputes between employers and their organized
employees.65 7 This article has reviewed the resultant body of case law,
illustrating that three different paradigms of the arbitration/judiciary
relationship have developed during this time.658
The first to develop was a minimalist model. Under this mode the
courts would routinely enforce the agreement to arbitrate and uphold the

649. See Hart v. Overseas Nat'l Airways, Inc., 541 F.2d 386, 389 (3d Cir. 1976).
650. See, ag., Woodson v. AMF Lesorland Centers, Inc., 842 F.2d 699 (3d Cir. 1988).
651. See, e.g., EEOC v. AIC See. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276 (7th Cir. 1995).
652. See, e.g., Hughes v. Matthews, 986 F.2d 1168, 1169 (8th Cir. 1992).
653. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32.
654. Id.
655. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1988).
656. Id. § 173(d) (1988).
657. See Textile workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 466 (1957).
658. These different paradigms include what we have termed the Minimalist Model, the
Expansionist Model, and the Unbounded Minimalist Model.
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resultant awards.659 However, it was not long before an expansionist
paradigm began to appear. Under the expansionist model, courts
periodically reviewed arbitration awards and set aside those that it found
flawed. 660 Furthermore, in arbitration cases that involved public
policies, the courts guaranteed the parties a right to a trial de novo if they
were displeased with the results of an arbitration decision. 6" In recent
years, we have seen the development of a narrow version of the
expansionist model of labor arbitration in the Supreme Court, a more
aggressive expansionist approach in the lower courts, and the emergence
of a third model, which we have called unbounded minimalism, in nonunion employment cases. 2 Under this doctrine, the courts have
routinely enforced agreements to arbitrate disputes that have been signed
by individual employees, even when statutory rights are involved. We
close with three thoughts.
EmpiricalResearch Needed.-The first thought pertains to the need
for empirical research on the fiuits of the Gilmer decision. The Supreme
Court formulated a significant new public policy in that decision. The
correctness of that policy, however, depends to a large degree on the
results in the arbitration process. We need more information on the
processes employed to select arbitrators in "Gilmerized" cases and the
characteristics of the arbitrators getting the cases. Was Mr. Gilmer right
when he questioned the neutrality of the process? Empirical research is
also needed on the decisions themselves. What are the plaintiffs'
"batting averages" and when they win, what kinds of awards do they
receive? In particular, do these awards follow the "make whole" remedy
of labor arbitration or the "punitive damages" model in many court
decisions.
Deference to Arbitration Urged in Labor Cases---In Section VII of
663
this article we indicated our support for the minimalist paradigm.
We argued that the courts should enforce arbitration awards as long as
they do not conflict with express terms of the agreement, impose requirements not contained within the agreement, or were not rationally
supported by the agreement. 66 In matters of public policy, we urged

659. See supra notes 36-51 and accompanying text discussing the Trilogy.
660. See supra notes 161-76 and accompanying text discussing the origins of the enforcement
controversy in the judicial review of labor arbitration awards.
661. See Gould, supra note 444, at 490-92; see also ELKOtUI & ELKOuIU, supra note 588, at
4.
662. See supra notes 486-533 and accompanying text discussing unbounded minimalism.

663. See supra part Vii.
664. See supra part VII.
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a broad application of NLRB post-arbitration deferral policies." 5 We
think that the support given by the Supreme Court to arbitration in
Gilmerupholds the concept of deference. But we urge deference mostly
because the record suggests that the problem of judicial review of labor
arbitration awards is important and that it is growing.
Although the number of appeals from arbitration awards is
small, 66 the absolute number of appeals is large and the issues are
substantial. 667 Most appeals involve job loss, 6"S rightly described as
the "extreme industrial penalty." 669 Between 1960 and 1988, over
1,000 labor arbitration awards were appealed to the federal district courts
and 438 to the circuit courts of appeal ° The number of appeals rose
from about thirty-three cases per year in the 1970s to seventy-one per
year between 1981 and 1988.671 This problem is exacerbated by delay.
Even if the employee wins, it takes almost sixteen months for a district
court decision;'n thirteen more months to decide cases appealed to the
circuits; 673 and another fourteen months for resolution by the Supreme
Court.674 Delay brings with it the kind of anger and frustration that
sours a labor-management relationship.
Furthermore, when a court makes it known that it may undertake a
full-scale review of an arbitration award, it undermines not only the
award, but the bargaining process as a whole. 675 The arbitration award
is what the parties bargained for and that is what they should get. If they
get an award that they do not like, they have their own ways of
protecting themselves. They can refuse to have arbitrators who have
given unpalatable decisions from selection lists, and, while it can be
costly to do so, they can renegotiate undesirable arbitration awards when

665. See supra part VII.
666. Feuille & LeRoy, supra note 553, at 38.
667. Feuille & LeRoy, supra note 553, at 42.

668. In the 24 cases on arbitrator error and public policy featured in this article beginning with
American Thread and ending with Stroehmann, 19 involved employee discharge and two were

prompted by layoff.
669. ELIoURI & ELKOIM, supra note 588, at 661.
670. Feuille & LeRoy, supra note 553, at 43-44.

671. Feuille & LeRoy, supranote 553, at 41 (data from the 1960s was not reported here because
the study reported only FMCS oases during those years. After 1970 the data base included both
FMCS and AAA cases).
672. ChristopherT. Hexter,JudicialReview ofLaborArbitrationAwards: How the Public Policy
Exception CasesIgnore the PublicPolicies UnderlyingLaborArbitration,34 ST. LOUIS U. LJ.77,

104 (1989).
673. Id.
674. Id.
675. See Joan Parker, supra note 551, at 708-11.
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the contract is renewed.
Needed: A Clarificationof Gilmer--In Section VIII we indicated
our belief that, while the Gilmer decision may have reached the correct
result, it is a decision in need of clarification. The Gilmer decision has
become the law of the land but it should be clarified in ways that (1)
encourage the creation of mechanisms to assure that a qualified stream
of neutral arbitrators is made available for these cases and that the
selection of the arbitrator remains within the control of the parties; (2)
the reach of the FAA be appropriately defined, including its application
or non-application in cases involving collective bargaining agreements;
(3) the plaintiff's right to appeal an arbitration decision is defined; and
(4) the arbitrator's remedial powers are defined such that the process is
not reduced to an inexpensive way of protecting organizations from
litigation.
We" feel that the playing field today is not level. Procedural
safeguards should be built into the employment arbitration area to
improve the chances of selecting neutral arbitrators from a neutral pool
and to promote a neutral process. We suspect the neutrality of such
industry-sponsored panels such as that found the NYSE. We also think
that the playing field would be made more level if joint funding of the
arbitration process became a term or condition of employment in those
companies that adopt employment arbitration. One of the difficulties in
this form of arbitration comes from the fact that the employer is usually
better able to afford the process.6 6 The problem is not solved when
the employer bears the entire cost because arbitrators have repeatedly
expressed discomfort with employer-supported systems. Employers who
decide to establish arbitration systems might consider giving all of their
employees a small raise - perhaps one or two dollars a week - which
would then be deducted from their paycheck, matched by the employer,
and placed in a fund to pay for the costs of subsequent arbitration.

676. See supra part VIIL

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol13/iss1/1

74

